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Abstract
Nowadays, the applications of online social networks (OSNs), such as Facebook, Twit-
ter, and Wechat, have largely affected people’s life in the real world. On one hand,
the OSN applications prompt the sharing of opinions, ideas, and news with Internet
users. On the other hand, unfortunately, they also facilitate the spread of malicious
information like spam, scam, malware as well as rumours. In some specific cases,
the OSN applications may lead to the safety problems of users. For example, the
recent popularity of Poke´mon Go has led to several accidents on road because players
was absorbed by the screens of mobile devices and was careless at the heavy traffic
when they went across the road. In order to investigate these problems and develop
countermeasures, the PhD candidate was strongly motivated to carry out a series of
case-driven studies related to OSN cybersecurity and safety issues: 1) OSN Spam, 2)
OSN Inference, 3) Poke´mon Go safety.
Firstly, we have done a number of comparative studies on the state-of-art of spam
detections in OSNs. we further develop deep learning based detection method to cap-
ture OSNs spam activities. Currently, many detection schemes have been proposed
on the typical OSN platform, Twitter. There are mainly three categories among cur-
rent Twitter spam detection methods: detection based on Syntax Analysis, Feature
Analysis, and Blacklisting Techniques. Based on our empirical studies, deep learn-
ing technique can well address the feature selection and optimisation problems in
spam-sparse datasets. According to experiments from both empirical and theoreti-
cal perspectives, our proposed analysis and methods outperformed most of current
typical countermeasures in this field.
xvii
Secondly, the Phd candidate investigated the exposure methods of spreading paths
of malicious information in OSNs, such as rumours and extreme ideas. Network in-
ference techniques have been extensively studied to explore the second issues through
better understanding the information diffusion in OSNs. There are two critical prob-
lems identified based on our literature review in this field. These two problems caused
by 1) alternative spreading paths and 2) users’ delivery delay. Accordingly, we pro-
posed a deep learning based method incorporating incomplete features of OSN users
in network inference. The experiments based on real datasets have demonstrated the
efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed method.
Thirdly, Poke´mon GO safety issue was also deeply investigated in the research.
The Phd candidate carried out a data driven analysis in order to examine and correlate
the behaviours of players (i.e. OSN users) in the virtual OSN world and the physical
world. The two real datasets were collected by on-road questionnaires from players
and sensors deployed by Melbourne city council monitoring pedestrians. Based on our
analysis, a symbiotic network was exposed to present the behaviours of players in the
real world and their corresponding avatars in the virtual world, and also to bridge the
two worlds through some geographically distributed joint nodes. Evaluation results
suggested when and where to deploy warning measurements to protect players from
danger.
In a nutshell, the research work presented in this thesis well addressed the three
security and safety issues in OSNs. The outperformance has been demonstrated by
the experiments in the research. In particular, to the best of our knowledge, we are
among the first to study the safety issue of Poke´mon GO in this field. The work will
benefit both academia and communities in the future.
Keywords: spam detection, cyber security, symbiotic social network, Online
social networks, network inference
xviii
Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter, this chapter briefly introduces the security and safety issues in On-
line Social Networks (OSNs). Twitter spam will be explained in details. Then, the
motivation and research issues are presented in Section 1.2. Section 1.3 briefly re-
views our works and their contributions. The organization of the thesis is outlined in
Section 1.4,
1.1 Introductions and Backgrounds
Over the past few years, online social networks (OSNs) such as Facebook, Twitter,
and Wechat are built on real-world social relationships and the popularity has grown
tremendously. Above OSNs platforms are popular collaboration and communication
tools for millions of Internet users [21]. From year 2013, Wechat has become the most
popular OSN platform among Chinese people. Especially, Wechat offer payment
functions to a number of online services, such as utilities, charity, mobile top up, etc.
For example, a virtual wallet can be used as cash to pay a small amount of money
with best wishes to friends.From this prospective, OSNs have extended its boundary
1
from communication platforms to provide their users with a wide variety of virtual-
interaction mechanisms. They are critical online communication and message sharing
platforms integrated into society’s daily life.
On one hand, the OSN applications prompt the sharing of opinions, ideas, and
news with Internet users. On the other hand, unfortunately, they also facilitate the
spread of malicious information like spam, scam, malware as well as rumours. In
some specific cases, the OSN applications may lead to the safety problems of users.
We take Twitter as example to show the popularity of OSN platform as well as the
security challenges. Twitter is one of the major OSN platforms in the world. This
platform provides microblogging services which allow users to post messages (tweets)
with maximal 140 characters [43]. People can share their ideas or post messages with
each other anytime and anywhere through multiple devices. Everyday, millions of
Twitter users share their moments or post their discoveries such as breaking news to
their followers [57]. However, the openness and convenience of Twitter platform also
attract criminal accounts (spammers) to attack the platform for the sake of making
money illegitimately. These attacks include spam, scam, phishing [7,176]. Moreover,
social spammers tend to be more rampant with the increasing usage of OSNs. As
there is a restriction on the length of tweets, it is common for spammers to broadcast
unsolicited spam tweets which can redirect users to external malicious websites [92].
Compared to the traditional spam which spread through emails, Twitter spam is more
dangerous and sophisticated in luring Internet users to get deceived [145]. According
to a recent report [63], the click-through rate of Twitter spam reaches 0.13%, while it
only achieves 0.0003%∼0.0006% in email spam. Twitter Spam is a critical problem
alone with the hidden spammer.
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Figure 1.1: Security Issues in Online Social Networks
There are a number of different security problems in OSNs. According to [53]
in Figure 1.1, these attacks can be organised into four broad categories: privacy
breaches, viral marketing, network structural attacks, and malware attacks. In fact,
with the wide adoption of mobile devices, these traditional OSNs rapidly employ the
location-based services. The location sharing service is becoming one of the most
important services in mobile online social networks (mOSNs) [141]. For example,
in location-sharing services, the popular online game, Poke´mon GO, asks users to
provide their accurate location information to the service provider. Otherwise, the
users can’t play the game. However, the location information is sensitive to users,
which may cause a safety issue. For example, it exposes the profile, user’s location
with a feature that allows users to tag who they are with at any given time. All these
kind of exposed information tremendously increase users’ vulnerability, potentially
being robbed, sexually assaulted, or worse. Predators can use this tool to track your
movements and determine when you are alone or when you are not at home.
The security issues and risks accompanying such developments have raised con-
cerns in industry, academia, and governments. Among all the security issues in OSNs,
this thesis mainly focuses on OSN cybersecurity and safety issues: 1) OSN Spam, 2)
OSN Inference, 3) Poke´mon Go safety.
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1.2 Motivations and Research Issues
Firstly, there are many methods in OSN spam detections area. We continue to take
Twitter as example. There are mainly three categories among current Twitter spam
detection methods: 1) detection based on Syntax Analysis, 2) Feature Analysis, and
3) Blacklisting Techniques. As text is the only format Twitter users can use, many
researchers focused on analysing tweets semantics to detect spam [42,43,54,70,71,89,
91,92,145,154,160,163,168,174]. More works have been proposed using the features
from both account and message aspects and then was analysed by statistical methods
(i.e. Feature Analysis) [8,17,27,28,32,35,43,44,49,52,57,63,70,71,74,90,92,100,129,
136, 138, 144, 146, 152, 162–164, 166, 173, 174, 176]. For instance, there are plenty of
works which utilised this method and achieved the real time detection rate of over
90% [14]. However, Liu et al. and Chen et al. found the problem of spam drift
which could affect the performance of this method [30,100]. Based on our analysis, a
spam drift problem was introduced by this thesis. The spam drift problem is that the
spam features fluctuate with the day changes, so that the model generated based on
historical tweets cannot be used to predict real time data. So far, there is no method
that can well solve the spam drift problem. A deep learning based method will be
proposed to address the spam drift issue. The next step of my research works on
improving the detection accuracy, cost and efficiency will be performed in the future.
Secondly, to investigate the exposure methods of spreading paths of malicious
information in OSNs, such as rumours and extreme ideas, network inference has been
extensively studied to better understand the information diffusion in online social
networks. In this field, a widely used priori knowledge is about users’ infection time
stamps. Researchers also assume that the smaller the time difference between two
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nodes, the higher the likelihood of an edge between the pair of users. Based on the
priori knowledge and assumption, current research has achieved around 60% accuracy
on real media site network datasets. New methods are needed to infer spreading path
of OSN malicious information with a better accuracy. We introduce a DNN-based
method to address the network inference issue and evaluate the experiment result
based on real world data.
Thirdly, since the location sharing services in ONSs is related to users’ physical
safety, a case study is conducted to explore the safety issues around. The thesis takes
the recent popular game, Poke´mon GO, as an example, which created two symbiotic
social networks by location-based mobile augmented reality (LMAR) technique. One
is in the physical world among players, and another one is in the cyber world among
players’ avatars. As far as we know, no study has been done to explore the formation
of each social network and their symbiosis. This study focuses on the physical safety
of OSNs users. The future research will be the on the social safety issues related to
the user’s activities of OSNs.
1.3 Overview of the Work and its Contribution
Motivated by the above problems, the following works have been done in the research.
In particular, a 10 days’ real dataset was collected to verify the spam drift question. A
deep learning based method has been proposed to address the problem in online social
network inference. Moreover, a case study of the Cyber-Physical Symbiotic Social
Networks was carried out in Melbourne CBD. The core works and contributions are
summarised as follows.
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• Recall that the spam features are changed with days, so that the historical
tweet based model cannot be used to predict real time data. we collected a
ten-day ground-truth dataset from Twitter’s Streaming API [32]. This dataset
contained more than 600 million tweets with URLs. It was revealed that most
spammers were keen on posting unsolicited links in their messages to redirect
victims to malicious websites or malware downloading [10]. Based on the empir-
ical studies, deep learning technique can well address the feature selection and
optimisation problems in spam-sparse dataset. According to experiments from
both empirical and theoretical perspectives, our proposed analysis and methods
outperformed most of current typical countermeasures in this field.
• In order to address the weakness of existing methods in online social network
inference, we conduct a series of technical analysis and empirical studies, and
demonstrated two critical problems 1) alternative spreading paths 2) users’ de-
livery delay, which lead to the inaccuracy of previous methods. In this chapter,
we developed an deep learning based method to address the inference inaccuracy
caused by the exposed two problems. This method determined the existence
of an edge between a pair of users according to part of the users’ features. To
evaluate the performance of our proposed method, we conducted a series of
experiments based on real social networks and simulations. Accordingly, the
proposed deep learning based method demonstrated a better efficiency and ef-
fectiveness on the real dataset.
• We carried out a data-driven research to study the symbiotic networks formed
by the oﬄine interactions of users and the online connections of the avatars.
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We studied the properties, user behaviour, and formation of such novel so-
cial networks. Accordingly, we used two real datasets in our research. First,
we designed a questionnaire to collect Poke´mon GO players’ individual be-
haviours in Poke´mon GO. Maps of Melbourne were then introduced to track
and record players’ usual playing areas. Second, we employed pedestrian count
data imported from sensors distributed across Melbourne CBD to reflect social
behaviours that differ from that of players. Based on the Poke´mon dataset,
we first built a symbiotic social network of Poke´mon GO players. The build-
ing process models and simulates the formation of social interaction among the
players. Second, we analysed the relationship between the formation of the vir-
tual network and the physical network. Next, we investigated how the social
behaviours changed after the symbiotic network emerged. According to our ex-
periment, the popular socialising locations of people have drastically changed
after the interference of Poke´mon GO. Our work is essential for modelling the
information diffusion, the user behaviours, or the impact of AR/VR on human
interaction in symbiotic social networks.
1.4 Thesis Organization
This section presents the overall organization of this thesis. The content of each
chapter is organised as follows:
• Chapter 2 : This chapter reviews related work. Three main categories among
current Twitter spam detection methods are reviewed. Specifically, in Sec-
tion 2.1, we build up the taxonomy according to extraction and classification
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methods which well present the recent advances in Twitter spam detection in
terms of feature extraction, followed by Section 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 which show the
analysis of existing Twitter spam detection methods based on syntax, feature
analysis and blacklisting techniques respectively. .
• Chapter 3 : In this chapter, we will compare typical Twitter spam detection
methods from several angles such as features and performance. Our focus is
on the comparison of syntax based methods and feature analysis based meth-
ods. Specifically, Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 present the comparison results of
URL based detection methods and tweet content based detection methods. In
Section 3.4 and Section 3.5, we present the experiments result of the statistic
information based detection methods and social graph based methods, respec-
tively. In Section 3.6, we conclude this chapter.
• Chapter 4 : In this chapter, we analysed the spam drift problem, and through
a series of empirical studies exploited its real impact on spam classification
performance. Specifically, a deep learning based Twitter spam detection method
was proposed. In Section 4.3 and Section 4.4. We analysed the spam and
non-spam feature distribution for ten days and visualised four representative
features, explored the impact of spam drift on machine leaning based Twitter
spam detection. We proposed a deep learning based spam detection method in
Section 4.5 to avoid spam drift issue. In Section 4.6, we conclude our proposed
detection framework on spam drift problem and future work.
• Chapter 5 : In this chapter, We proposed a deep learning based method incor-
porating incomplete features of OSN users in network inference. Specifically,
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Section 5.2 discusses the critical problems in previous network inference methods
when put them into OSN inference. Section 5.3 presents our model in details.
Section 5.4 evaluates the performance of the proposed model. Related works
are introduced in Section 5.5. Finally, conclusion and discussion are included
in Section 5.6.
• Chapter 6 : In this chapter, we present a case study on the Cyber-Physical
Symbiotic Social Networks. In order to explored the formation of each so-
cial network and their symbiosis, a data-driven research was conducted on the
Poke´mon GO game to solve this problem. In particular, we used maps of Mel-
bourne (Australia) to track and record their usual playing areas, then we mod-
elled the formation of the symbiotic social networks in both physical world (i.e.
for players) and cyber world (i.e. for avatars) as well as interactions between
players and Poke´mon GO elements.
• Chapter 7 : This chapter make a summary to the research in this thesis, and
highlights several directions for future research.
To maintain readability, each chapter is organised in a self-contained format, and
some essential contents, e.g. definition, introduction, and motivation, are briefly
recounted in related chapters.
9
Chapter 2
Literature Review
Currently, many efforts have been made in developing effective Twitter spam de-
tection methods. Especially in the last three years, there were some breakthrough
innovative techniques developed [8, 32, 33, 35, 44, 49, 58, 70, 71, 73, 92, 98, 100, 116, 140,
142,144,154,162,166,166,173]. The improvements of these newly developed methods
covered almost all research issues in Twitter spam detection field, such as selection
mechanisms of spam features, sampling techniques, detection engines with better ac-
curacy and so on. Therefore, it is necessary to provide a survey on both past and
new methods in detecting spam for future research.
In order to address the problem of Twitter spam, in the recent few years, there
have been many detection schemes put forward. There are three main categories
among current Twitter spam detection methods: detection based on Syntax Analysis,
Feature Analysis and Blacklisting Techniques. As text is the only format Twitter
users can use, many researchers focus on analysing tweets semantics to detect spam
[42,43,54,70,71,89,91,92,145,154,160,163,168,174]. More work was proposed using
the features from both account and message aspects and applied a statistical method
to them (i.e. Feature Analysis) [8, 17, 27, 28, 32, 35, 43, 44, 49, 52, 57, 63, 70, 71, 74, 90,
10
92,100,129,136,138,144,146,152,162–164,166,173,174,176]. In addition, researchers
also relied on third party services such as blacklisting technique to block malicious
information [57,63,102–104,174].
In this chapter, we reviewed these three main categories of current Twitter spam
detection methods. Specifically, Section 2.1 illustrates the taxonomy of the state-of-
art, followed by Section 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 which show the analysis of existing Twitter
spam detection methods based on syntax, feature analysis and blacklisting techniques
respectively. Finally, we conclude this literature review in Section 2.5.
2.1 Taxonomy
It is challenging to categorise current technologies into several parts. Because most
methods may borrow the ideas from many technologies that cover different categories
in Twitter spam detection, it is difficult to divide the state-of-art and make sure
each work exclusively drop into one category. Therefore, to be specific, we build
up the taxonomy according to extraction and classification methods. Although this
taxonomy creation method cannot avoid the case of one method dropping into mul-
tiple categories, our taxonomy will well present the recent advances in Twitter spam
detection in terms of feature extraction.
What does the taxonomy tell us? We categorise the state-of-art mainly by
their feature selection methods. The taxonomy is shown in Fig. 2.1. Based on the
difference from feature processing, we obtain three major categories: detection based
on 1) syntax analysis, 2) feature analysis and 3) blacklist. Each category of detection
methods relies on a specific group of features and selection methods. For the first
category (i.e. syntax analysis), the features are mainly extracted from key segments
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(Refer to Section 3)
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Tweet Content 
(Refer to Section 3.2)
Key Segment
(Refer to Section 3.1)
Social Graph
(Refer to Section 4.2)
Statistic Info
(Refer to Section 4.1)
URL
Keyword
Username 
Pattern
Term-Frequency-
based (TF-IDF)
Bag of Words
Sparse Learning
Tweet & Account 
Statistic Info
Tweet Statistic 
Info
Campaign 
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Figure 2.1: The taxonomy of Twitter spam detection methods. There are three main
categories for current techniques. Each sub-category includes some typical methods,
and we will explain them individually.
embedded in tweets or by means which indicates the content of tweets such as bag-of-
words. For the second category (i.e. feature analysis), the features are normally from
the statistic information of tweets and/or Twitter accounts, or from the topological
information hidden in social graphs. The last category (i.e. blacklist) represents the
simplest group of detection methods which are now commonly used in industries.
Why do we build up taxonomy by feature selection? Traditional tax-
onomies in Twitter spam detection are constructed by anti-spam strategies [68] or
types of machine learning techniques (i.e. supervised, unsupervised, or semi-supervised)
[150]. In this survey, we build up the taxonomy based on the categories of feature
selection. According to our literature review (see details in Section 2.2 and 2.3), the
majority of Twitter spam detection methods rely on machine learning based tech-
niques. However, the essential differences of those methods are not from machine
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Figure 2.2: Generic Twitter spam detection framework. The data will be collected
first and then the features are extracted and fed to the training and classification
modules.
learning algorithms, but from the features and their selection strategies. In fact, al-
most every paper in this field introduces a group of distinct features and then with
another group of well-known machine learning based classifiers to detect spamming
activities in Twitter (e.g. [32, 35, 70, 166, 173]). Our taxonomy will provide a brand-
new view of angle to explore the core challenges as well as solutions in Twitter spam
detection. To the best of our knowledge, this taxonomy accurately categorises various
detection methods in this field.
2.2 Detection based on Syntax Analysis
In this section, we will analyse the detection methods based on syntax analysis and
discuss their pros and cons. These methods can be categorised into two parts: 1) key
segment and 2) tweet content. Before we go for the details, we briefly analyse the
generic Twitter spam detection framework.
As shown in Figure 2.2, Twitter posts will first be collected by data collection
module. Suspicious tweets will be selected by a set of basic rules and then used for
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feature extraction. For supervised classification engine, the resultant feature vectors
will first be fed to the training module. But for unsupervised classification engine,
the feature vectors will be directly fed to the engine to distinguish spam out of benign
tweets. Only the benign tweets can reach the real systems. Most existing detection
methods follow this framework.
2.2.1 Key Segment
First of all, we discuss the key segment methods. These methods collect indicative
segments such as keywords, username patterns and URLs, to represent the context
of tweets and posters. The motivation of these methods is that real-world spammers
usually make use of sensitive information with deceptive URLs to attract Twitter
users. Therefore, a tweet which contains sensitive keywords, phrases or suspicious
URLs is more likely to be spam [31,163].
URL
The most popular key segments are about URLs. The related works that drop in this
category are listed as follows: [41,43,54,63,78,91,103,104,108,139,145,146,157,174].
In particular, the works [92,173] are published in the last three years.
Detailed Methods: We continue to elaborate the details of URL based detection
methods as follows:
First, many URL based detection methods focus on shortened URLs. Since Twitter
limits the number of characters in every tweet, URLs which are usually composed of
many characters will be pre-processed by shortening services in order to accommodate
more descriptive words in tweets [41,63,78,108,139]. Shortened URLs may obfuscate
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the direct lexical meanings and hide malicious links. Therefore, shortened URLs
are considered as major key segments in terms of URLs. For example, to prevent
the abuse of shortening services such as bit.ly, Thomas et al. developed a shortener
identifier to detect spammers [146]. They calculated respectively the ratios of spam
and non-spam tweets that have used shortening services in their descriptions. The
division product of the two ratios will be regarded as the discriminant to identify
spam tweets. If the product is greater than one, the usage of shortening services most
probably indicates a spamming activity. Meanwhile, shorteners are ranked according
to their popularity in the real world. Thomas et al. combined the reputation and
frequency of each URL and domain to find the differences between spammers and
benign accounts (e.g. bit.ly accounted for the highest share of usage as 34.86%).
Because most methods extract features from shortened URLs, we will explain the
usage of shortened URLs together with other measurements in the following two
parts.
Second, there are also many methods that use the duplication of URLs to clas-
sify tweets or accounts. The tweets or accounts will be clustered into campaigns
according to the shared URLs. Spamming activities will be exposed based on cam-
paigns. For example, Chu et al. and Gao et al. proposed methods to cluster corre-
lated tweets into campaigns by both textual description and shortened URLs in each
tweet [43, 54]. Zhang et al. developed a scheme to link accounts who post similar
tweets according to their shared URLs [173, 174]. After various Twitter campaigns
are exposed by using URL based methods, traditional machine learning algorithms
can further be employed to distinguish spamming campaigns from regular campaigns.
These traditional algorithms usually adopt statistic features as well (refer to Section
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2.3) [43, 173, 174]. To differentiate tweets into various campaigns, Chu et al. pre-
sented each tweet as a pair of text and URL parts [43]. A tweet campaign was then
represented as ci =< ui, Ti, Ai >, where ui denoted the ith shared final URL (i.e.
the hidden URL reverse-engineered from redirection chains), Ti was the set of tweets
that included ui, and Ai denoted the accounts that were associated with Ti. Given a
campaign C, for an arbitrary tweet, if the ci calculated by its ui belonged to C, the
tweet was added into C. To cluster accounts into campaigns, Zhang et al. applied
Shannon information theory and computed the entropy through URLs embedded in
the tweets [173,174]. The similarity could be measured by the entropy shared among
different accounts as well as the intervals between tweets. The method then ranked
the relationships the relationships among Twitter accounts according to the values
of similarities. On the basis of it, the connection graph was constructed by select-
ing those which had large values of similarities (i.e. > threshold). Every isolated
subgraph indicated a campaign for a specific purpose.
Third, features distilled from URLs are also commonly used in spam detection.
Traditionally, the features include lexical attributes, page content and domain hosting
properties [103,104,157]. Recent works also adopted the features which can help iden-
tify malicious URLs, such as the features related to IP addresses [91, 92, 145]. Their
empirical analysis suggested that the newly adopted URL features were more corre-
lated with spam activities. Generally speaking, the third type of URL based methods
is used for online spam detection due to its fast classification speed [104]. Note that,
although we divide the URL based methods into the above three parts, most of cur-
rent methods mixed the techniques in the three parts together. For example, almost
all URL based methods included analysis of shortened URLs [91,92,103,104,145,157].
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In this case, there are several methods that rely on features of malicious URLs them-
selves [91,92,145]. For example, Thomas et al. collected and extracted features from
three aspects: 1) web browser (e.g. final URL and redirects), 2) DNS resolver (e.g.
DNS), and 3) IP address analysis (e.g. geolocation) [145]. The resultant raw features
will be further transformed and organised in vectors. They also introduced and com-
bined the logistic regression method (LR) [51] and the stochastic gradient descent
method to implement to train the classifier. Lately, Lee and Kim proposed using
the correlations of URL directed chains as a new URL feature [91, 92]. In addition
to this new feature, a series of traditional URL features [145] and tweet content fea-
tures [8, 32, 35, 43] were also used through a feature normalization process [92]. All
the features worked together and were tested on seven LIBLINEAR classifiers [50].
Performance : In this paragraph, we focus on the performance of the above
URL based methods. First, Thomas et al. studied the likelihood ratio of shorteners
[146]. According to their analysis based on shortened URLs, they found 77% of spam
accounts identified by Twitter are suspended within one day of their first tweet. They
also identified five spam campaigns which controlled 145 thousand accounts. Because
each campaign enacted a unique spamming strategy, the spamming activities were
able to persist for months at a time. Recall that URL based spam detection complies
with the framework in Fig. 2.2. Second, a typical example of spamming campaign
detection was proposed by Chu et al. [43]. They proposed organising features from
tweets, accounts and campaigns (e.g. URL redirections, account reputation, and
posting device makeups, respectively). Most of these features were collected from
Twitter’s Streaming API [6]. According to their experiments, they found the Random
Forest classifier had the best performance with an Accuracy 94.5%. Third, the works
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[91, 92, 145] proposed using new URL features for spam detection. Their experiment
results suggested that the new features largely improved the detection accuracy. For
example, Lee and Kim’s work achieved 0.9027 AUC (Area Under Curve) [101] and
91.71% Accuracy by selecting an L2-regularized L1-loss support vector classification
(SVC) algorithm from seven classification algorithms [92].
Pros and cons: We discuss the pros and cons of URL based methods below.
We first come to the advantages. Generally speaking, due to the length limit of
tweet description, spammers are more likely to post URLs than plain text to spread
malicious information. Therefore, URL based methods are implicitly tailored to ex-
amine tweets which are abundant of URLs especially on criminal accounts. Moreover,
current URL based methods have overcome the inaccuracy problem caused by URL
shortening services. Hidden clues of spamming activities will be exposed and replayed
by reverse engineering the shortened URLs into original URLs. There are also three
weaknesses in current URL based methods. The first weakness is about relatively
high expenditure in practices. According to a recent study, the filtering cost might
reach $22,751/month for 15.3 million URLs/day [145]. Second, regarding redirections
in tweets, only HTTP redirection can be processed by current URL based methods.
The second weakness largely narrows down the real-world usability of these meth-
ods. Finally, although URL based methods are able to run fast (e.g. processing
576,000 URLs/hour) [92], this type of methods still cannot detect malicious URLs
with ‘conditional’ behaviours (refer to [92]).
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Keyword/Username Pattern
Keywords or username patterns can also be used to detect Twitter spam. The idea
sounds very intuitive and straightforward. However, to the best of our knowledge,
there are only two papers that drop in this category [54,168].
Detailed Methods : In this paragraph, we analyse and explain the details of
the method that relies on keywords and username patterns. Yardi et al. developed
a spam detection algorithm by detecting keywords and matching username pattern
in tweets [168]. The assumption of this method is that the username pattern ‘let-
ter+number’ was highly correlated with spamming accounts. Spam tweets usually
referred to unsolicited messages through manipulating fake accounts automatically
in conventional patterns. Meanwhile, tweets that contained sensitive keywords such
as ‘naked’ were more likely to be spam. This method has also been applied to Face-
book [54]. Searching function by keywords in Twitter and Facebook was employed
in this method to facilitate the identification of suspicious URLs such as the keyword
‘click here’. In practice, the keywords and username patterns will work together with
shortened URLs to help distinguish regular posts from spam activities [168].
Performance : Yardi et al. first studied #robotpickuplines tweets dataset and
extracted the attributes from key segments [168]. By matching these specific segments
to the sensitive keywords and username patterns, the method could achieve an Accu-
racy of 91%. In addition, keyword searching functions also helped detect obfuscated
URLs in tweets, the performance of this method can be further improved by combin-
ing with other techniques such as removing illegal characters from the description of
tweets [54].
Pros and cons : We further discuss the pros and cons of keywords and username
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patterns in Twitter spam detection. Because spammers usually introduce sensitive
words such as ‘hot topics’ to attract victims, the methods that rely on keywords
and username patterns will efficiently capture the spam tweets (refer to [168]). This
type of the methods has two disadvantages. First, keywords and username patterns
are actually a double-blades sword. For example, the work [168] only investigated
#robotpickuplines related datasets. Therefore, the collected properties of tweets were
too less to detect spamming activities. This might significantly limit the application of
this method. Second, this method cannot counter sophisticated spamming activities.
By using social engineering methods, spamming activities can easily avoid the usage
of popular keywords and username patterns.
2.2.2 Tweet Content
We secondly discuss the spam detection methods that focus on tweet content. Because
spammers usually compose the spam content with similar malicious topics or words,
a tweet that contains those malicious topics and words are more likely to be spam.
There are currently three major techniques to represent textual content of tweets: TF-
IDF (Term Frequency - Inverse Document Frequency) [9], bag of words, and sparse
learning. In the following, we will discuss the details of tweet content based methods
according to the three representation techniques.
TF-IDF
TF-IDF is the most popular technique to extract the meaning of tweets. The related
works that drop in this category are listed as follows: [43, 89, 163]. In particular, the
works [70] are published in the last three years.
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Detailed Methods : Actually, TF-IDF has been widely used as a metric in text
retrieval to obtain the representation terms and weights of contextual words [130].
Based on this technique, Yang et al. designed a metric to measure the tweet semantic
correlation between each pair of accounts [163]. Chu et al. also applied it to check the
similarity among content syntaxes of tweets by the Vector Space Model [131] which
could transfer tweets into vectors [43]. While the content similarity of legitimate
campaigns was significantly stronger than spamming campaigns, these vectors were
capable of distinguishing spam from non-spam [43].
The detection based on TF-IDF technique will first identify duplicated tweets in
a campaign. The Twitter campaigns will then be classified into spam campaigns and
non-spam campaigns. For example, the words in the training tweets were calculated
by TF-IDF technique and converted to vectors using specific techniques such as the
Vector Space Model [131] [43, 163]. The similarity between an arbitrary pair of two
tweets was obtained from the cosine of the two corresponding vectors. Along with
other typical features, they were treated as the input of the classifiers for experiments.
Performance : We discuss the performance of the methods that adopted TF-
IDF technique. Chu et al. compared eight conventional machine learning algorithms,
and found that Random Forest outperformed other methods such as Decision Tree
by using Cross Validation [43]. To compare the performance of various features, the
content similarity obtained by TF-IDF technique could be ranked as the 9th of the
top ten features, which contributed 72.3% Accuracy to Random Forest classifier (the
highest one was 85.6%) [43]. Moreover, Yang et al. combined the tweet content
and social relationship, and calculated the malicious scores by the content similarity
between an arbitrary account and its followings [163]. Their proposed method ‘CIA’
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outperformed other methods as it could infer 13 more unknown spammers than RAND
giving 10 identified criminal accounts [163].
Pros and cons : For TF-IDF mehtods, we mainly focus on their weaknesses.
Although the similarity was an influential feature to improve the accuracy of the
spam detection, it might be replaced or modified as spammers have become more and
more sophisticated deceptive.
Bag of Words
The bag-of-words method was a typical text representation and was widely used for
pre-processing tweets before training a classifier. The related works that drop in this
category are listed as follows: [42, 89,90].
Detailed Methods : The bag-of-words method employed previous TF-IDF tech-
nique as the weighted algorithm to realise the vector representation (text-based fea-
tures) [89, 90]. Meanwhile, this model has also been widely adopted in Bayesian
algorithm to pick up specific words from paragraphs [42]. The bag-of-words method
can be used to measure statistical features (e.g. the content similarity) or build the
text classifier directly. The features extracted by the bag-of-words methods are usu-
ally text-based. By removing punctuation, lowercasing all the characters in a tweet
and tokenizing each word using the bag-of-words method, the terms was weighted
by TF-IDF and converted into text-based features [90]. These features are also inte-
grated with other types of features from account and tweet level and work together
for Twitter spam detection. The feature ‘content similarity’ was calculated by the
standard cosine distance between two targeted bag-of-words vectors [90]. In addition,
for building the text classifier, when the probability of a message belonged to a class
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was higher than a certain threshold, then the assumption was true [42]. The mes-
sage was represented by a feature vector and each dimension represented one or more
words as bag-of-words [42].
Performance : The bag-of-words method was effective to construct text-based
features such as tweets similarity [89,90]. Same as TF-IDF, the bag-of-words method
also assumed that the content similarity of spam tweets was dramatically higher than
benign tweets because spammers usually posted duplicate tweets [90]. Combined
with other traditional features, the Weka classifier ‘Decorate’ [159] achieved the best
Accuracy as high as 88.98% [90]. The bag-of-words method can also be used to
implement a more powerful Bayesian text classifier like CRM114 [169].
Pros and cons: Bag-of-words is the most typical method in email spam detec-
tion [24]. The idea is simple and easy to be implemented. However, in practice, bag-
of-words can only be one indicator of Twitter spam detection. Real-world methods
will combine bag-of-words as a typical feature with other features in Twitter accounts
and their social relationships [42]. The methods that only rely on bag-of-words may
not achieve the performance as good as other methods which employ features from
other aspects in Twitter. For example, Bayesian classifier has been widely used in
bag-of-words methods to detect spam [42]. In this category, the input of Bayesian
classifier only includes the description of tweets without account information of the
posters. This considerably influences the performance of spam detection [169].
Sparse Learning
Sparse learning is the last one in tweet content based methods. As the traditional
text presentation methods such as bag-of-words and n-gram [118] may lead to high
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dimension of feature vectors, Hu et al. proposed a sparse representation for the key
phrases or words instead of all the sentences [70,71]. In particular, the works [70,71]
are published in the last three years.
Detailed Methods: This method applied a non-negative matrix factorization
model (NMF) [86] to represent the tweets by a lower-dimension feature vector [70]. An
optimization algorithm was then employed to transfer the vector from the text level
to the topic level. With shrunk length of vectors, the features are more representative
and clustered to identify spam activities. Specifically, as there are always a few topics
for an arbitrary tweet, this method can be ‘sparse’ and more accurate.
Performance : Compared to four batch-mode leaning methods, the sparse learn-
ing method performed best in a five-fold cross-validation [70]. This method performed
about 8% better than LS Content [83] [70].
Pros and cons : These methods in this category combine both network and
tweet content to detect spammers. It is slightly faster than so-called batch-mode
learning algorithm (note: as a comparison target only discussed in [70]). However, if
the user factors are considered, the detection accuracy will be greatly improved.
2.3 Detection based on Feature Analysis
In this section, we analyse feature analysis based detection methods and discuss their
pros and cons. We divide this category into two sub-categories: detection approaches
by statistic information and social graph.
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Table 2.1: Typical Tweet-based Features
Notation Description
no tweet The number of tweets a user posts.
no retweet The number of retweets for a tweet.
no hashtag (#) The number of hashtags in a tweet.
no usermention (@) The number of usermentions in a tweet.
no url The number of URLs in a tweet.
fra url tweet The fraction of tweets containing URLs.
no char The number of characters in a tweet.
no digit The number of digits in a tweet.
2.3.1 Statistic Information
To begin with, we discuss the statistic information methods. These methods collect
statistic features from user profiles and tweets. The detection methods based on
statistic information comply with the framework in Fig. 2.2. This sub-category is
further divided into three parts according to the places where we extract statistic
information: 1) tweet statistic information, 2) account statistic information and 3)
campaign statistic information.
Tweet Statistic Information
For the methods that are based on tweet statistic information, most works combined
features from other levels such as account [8, 17, 32, 35, 43, 90, 92, 100, 136, 138, 162,
164, 173, 174]. There are also some studies that only applied text-based features
to construct a binary classifier [49, 52]. This technique is prevalent in other social
networks as well [44,74]. In particular, the works [8,32,35,44,44,49,92,100,162,173]
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Table 2.2: Typical Account-based Features
Notation Description
account age The age of an account until the time point of sending
the most recent messages.
no follower The number of follower of the Twitter user.
no following The number of following/friends of the Twitter user.
reputation The ratio of following number to follower number for the
Twitter user.
are published in the last three years.
Detailed Methods : Generally, spammers employed social engineering tech-
niques to manipulate text description. Therefore, the text-based classification meth-
ods could be very useful from the empirical perspective. Table 2.1 has shown a series
of representative tweet-based features. These features are feasible to differentiate the
spam and benign tweets. For example, it was found that spammers tried to broad-
cast more messages disguised as legitimate users [164]. Similarly, based on cumulative
distribution function (CDF) analysis [88], it was reported that spam tweets usually
contained more hashtags, URLs and spam words than normal messages [17]. In
addition, spammers usually included more digits in their tweets compared to benign
users [35]. All these features are very useful and indicative in Twitter spam detection.
Performance : The usage of statistic features resulted in good performance
in Twitter spam detection. Chao et al. set up the experiments on six machine
learning algorithms and achieved the F-measure as high as 93.6% by Random Forest
method [35]. Wang developed a Naive Bayesian based method which achieved the
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best Precision of 89% [152]. In addition, to explore the influence of the features, by
applying χ2 method (Chi Squared) [165], ten most significant features were ranked
and it was found that the tweet related features played an important role [17]. For
example, the fraction of tweets with URLs was ranked as the first, and the average
number of URLs per tweet was ranked as the third.
Pros and cons : Many works applied content-based features to a series of ma-
chine learning classifiers, because they could represent tweets effectively. However, the
contextual parts of tweets are usually manipulated by social engineering techniques,
which can lead to the problem of feature fabrication [137]. In addition, the differen-
tiation ability of text-based features in different datasets varies from each other. For
instance, many criminal accounts posted many duplicate tweets. But in some other
datasets, there are some benign users who also post duplicate tweets [152]. Moreover,
malicious content can be changed by spammers easily. Correspondingly, the features
that indicate the old spammers also need to be revised in order to catch up with the
changes in Twitter spam.
Account Statistic Information
There are also some methods that focused on the statistic information of Twitter
accounts [8, 17, 32, 35, 43, 52, 63, 90, 92, 100, 136, 138, 146, 152, 162, 164, 173, 174]. The
account-based features were also utilised in other online social network platforms such
as LSN [44] and Renren [166,176]. In particular, the works [8,32,35,92,100,162,166,
173] are published in the last three years.
Detailed Methods : Several typical account-level features are shown in Table
2.2. The account-based features can also differentiate spam and non-spam effectively.
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For example, the number of benign accounts’ followings and the number of followers
were much larger than the ones in spammers, and the life cycle of spammers was also
shorter compared to legitimate users [35]. Specifically, the feature ‘reputation’ had
a different performance from other features. Generally, the reputation of a spammer
was either 100% or very low, while the reputation of a normal user ranged from 30% to
90% [152]. This will greatly help distinguish spam activities from normal behaviours.
Performance : Ahmed and Abulaish proposed three similar spam detection
methods on Facebook and Twitter [8]. The Twitter method achieved the best De-
tection Rate (DR) (98.7%) and lowest FPR (1.4%) by using the rule learner (Jrip)
[121] [8]. Benevenuto et al. employed a Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier [75]
to detect both spam and spammers based on real-world datasets [5] [17]. The result
showed that the Accuracy was similar: 87.2% towards spam detection and 87.6%
towards spammer detection.
Pros and cons: The features based on account statistic information are more
robust because they could hardly change in various spamming activities. These fea-
tures are considered as the input of their classification methods. As ‘everything has an
exception’, there are some exceptions for the robust features. For instance, although
criminal accounts usually do not have as many as followers of legitimate accounts,
there are always some spammers who own a large number of followers [152]. This
is caused by their deceptive means in luring others to follow them. The exceptions
will reduce the detection accuracy. In practice, this kind of features normally work
with other features in Twitter spam detection such as tweet-based ones (see details
in Section 2.3.1).
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Table 2.3: Typical Campaign-based Features
Notation Description
ratio hashtag The ratio of the number of hashtags in the tweets to the
number of tweets in the campaign.
ratio mention The ratio of the number of mentions in the tweets to the
number of tweets in the campaign.
score content similarity The content self-similarity of the campaign.
device posting The ratios of manual and auto devices in the campaign.
density following The average number of the accounts’ following in the cam-
paign.
no domain The average number of distinct domains in the campaign.
Campaign Statistic Information
For the methods based on campaign statistic information, we have the works [43,52,
63,138,174]. In particular, the work [173] is published in the last three years.
Detailed Methods : Instead of detecting spam tweets one by one, many re-
searchers clustered spam into a series of groups according to their similarity on tweet
description or URLs [43,52,63,173,174]. Stringhini et al. also developed a similar de-
tection method which targeted at spammers [138]. Typical campaign-based features
are listed in Table 2.3. To cluster similar spam or spammers, URL is usually consid-
ered as an important feature because similar URLs sometimes indicate same interests
or topics [43, 52, 63, 138, 173, 174]. Because some legitimate users also posted URLs,
the interval between tweets can be added as a parameter to improve the similarity
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among spammers [173]. After the tweets or accounts are clustered, the campaign-
level features are applied to classify the uncategorised groups by machine learning
classifiers or manual identification. Considering the feature of content self-similarity
score, as spammers may apply a text template and post similar content, the syntax
similarity for criminal campaigns can be higher than benign campaigns [43].
Performance : Given a dataset as the ground-truth [109], Chu et al. utilised
Random Forest algorithm as the classifier and achieved the Accuracy of 94.5% [43].
Based on the SVM classifier, the clusters were first categorised by URLs and time
interval of tweets and then classified with 87.6% F1-measure and 90.3% Precision
[173]. In addition, it also ranked the campaign-based features using information
gain [76] and χ2 [165], and both showed the text similarity ranked the first [173].
Pros and cons: Campaign-based methods are efficient but too error-prone. In
the clustering pre-processing procedure, some tweets or accounts may be clustered
into wrong groups. This recursively leads to more errors in the next classification
process. Besides, some campaigns are classified manually [146], it can be extremely
time-consuming.
2.3.2 Social Graph
In this subsection, we discuss the social graph based methods. These methods
extract features from social graphs of Twitter users according to their following
and follower relationships. We divide this sub-category into two parts: 1) graph-
based methods which focus more on the macroscopic attributes of graph nodes, and
2) neighbourhood-based methods which concentrate on microscopic relationships of
graph nodes.
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Graph-based
There are many works that extract graph-based features to catch spammers such as
social degree for a node [52, 57, 70, 71, 136, 146, 152, 162, 163]. Graph-based methods
are also adopted in spam detection in other social network platforms such as LSN
[27, 44, 129]. In particular, the works [44, 70, 71, 162] are published in the last three
years.
Detailed Methods: Graph-based features can be classified into two categories:
social and structure features. The first category is similar to account-based features
(refers to Section 2.3.1). Generally speaking, each node in a social graph represents
an account. The indegree of a node (i.e. the number of nodes adjacent to the
node) denotes the number of followers, and the outdegree refers to the number of
following [52, 57, 70, 71, 146, 152]. These graph-based features are used in machine
learning based classifiers to detect spamming activities. The second category focuses
on the structure of social graphs. For example, Song et al. measured the Distance and
Connectivity [136]. Distance was defined as the shortest path between an arbitrary
pair of users in the graph. It was reported that spam normally came from a specific
user who was at least three hops from the victim. Moreover, Connectivity measured
the intensity of the connection between a pair of neighbouring users. According to the
Menger’s theorem [120], the connection was calculated by unique paths between two
nodes. Yang et al. tested three features (i.e. Graph Density, Reciprocity and Average
Shortest Path Length) [163]. Yang et al. also used three more robust features: Local
Clustering Coefficient (LCC), Betweenness Centrality (BC) and Bidirectional Links
Ratio (BLR) [162]. LCC is the ratio of the existing links among the vertices to the
maximum links [69]. This feature is used to produce the small social graph for the
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targeted account. BC measures the centrality of an account in a graph [114]. If a
node stands in the middle of many shortest paths, this node will hold a high BC
value. The spammers can be identified according to the BC values because they
normally attach to arbitrary users in the graph [162]. BLC refers to the proportion
of bidirectional links (i.e. two accounts follow each other) to all relationships of an
account. Because Twitter spammers are trying to follow a large number of users with
a few account following back, their bidirectional links ratio will be significantly lower
than legitimate users, which can be used to identify spammers [162].
Performance : The social graph is an effective means in spam detection, and
its related features are treated as useful influence factors to distinguish spam and
non-spam. For example, considering each account as a node, the social relationships
in Twitter can be transferred into a directed graph according to the following direc-
tion. It was found that the average length of shortest paths among spammers was
shorter than benign accounts, and those criminal accounts accordingly constructed a
small social network [163]. Given a criminal account, probabilistically around 0.0625
criminal accounts can be correctly inferred from the social relationships [163]. Using
the graph-based features, the Bagging classifier [122] could achieve the TPR as high
as 95.1% [136].
Pros and cons: As there are millions of Twitter users, it is impractical to collect
and analyse the overall Twitter social graph. Therefore, the datasets are unbiased
and the accuracy is not steady. In addition, spammers tend to act as legitimate users
by attaching benign attributes such as users’ followings and followers [162]. These
innovative features are necessary to be updated frequently in order to catch up with
latest spamming activities.
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Table 2.4: Typical Neighbourhood-based Features
Notation Description
ave nfer The average number of neighbours’ followers for an ac-
count.
ave ntwt The average number of neighbours’ posting tweets for
an account.
ratio fing mnfer The ratio of followings to median neighbours’ followers.
Neighbourhood-based
In the recent three years, there is an innovative method that focuses on neighbourhood-
based features in social graph to detect Twitter spam [162]. Compared to Sec-
tion 2.3.2, the neighbourhood-based method extracts features specifically from direct
neighbouring relationships of graph nodes. We discuss the detail of this novel method
in the following.
Detailed Methods : The features are shown in Table 2.4. Generally speaking,
the number of followers represents the popularity of an account. The legitimate users
are more likely to be neighbours of prevalent accounts. Therefore, given an arbitrary
user, the average number of his/her neighbours’ followers will be relatively higher if
the user is a spammer. Likewise, the number of the tweets from one account can also
denote the prevalence, the neighbours of criminal accounts usually broadcast fewer
tweets. For the last feature in Table 2.4, it is calculated as:
ratio fing mnfer =
Nfing
Mnfer
,
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wherein Nfing represents the number of following accounts, and Mnfer is the me-
dian number of follower numbers for an account’s all following numbers. Because
spammers usually follow a large number of users randomly, the value of Mnfer will
be small and Nfing will be high. That will result in a higher ratio fing mnfer for
spammers than the one for benign users.
Performance : Yang et al. examined four classifiers and selected the Random
Forest method due to its superior performance (F1-measure: 90%). The performance
improved 10.1% after the neighbourhood-based features were applied into the meth-
ods.
Pros and cons : The robustness of the features was measured in [162]. It
was found that the robustness of the first two features is extremely low. These
neighbourhood-based features utilise the number of followers and the number of tweets
to represent the popularity. Since there are many popular accounts with plenty of
followers or tweets, these features are easily to be evaded by spammers.
2.4 Blacklist
In this section, we analyse the detection methods which rely on the third party
blacklisting techniques. We will also discuss the pros and cons of this type of methods.
Blacklisting techniques are widely used in current works for Twitter spam detection
or dataset labelling [43, 57, 63, 103, 146, 174]. In particular, the works [92, 173] are
published in the last three years.
Detailed Methods : Blacklisting techniques usually apply the third party ser-
vices to add malicious information such as URLs and accounts into a blacklist. It
can detect the spam directly through scanning the list and is widely employed in the
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real world. For example, Twitter applied Google’s Safe Browsing API [3] to prevent
the unsolicited links [63]. It worked with the history data from URIBL, Joewein and
Google blacklists [66]. Before the spam arrives at victims, the malicious links will be
blocked by these blacklists. At the same time, the new suspicious links will be added
into the blacklisting dataset. In fact, many blacklists check at the domain level, not
the specific URL. For example, if the whole domain ’bit.ly’ is blacklisted, even the
URL is benign, it’s still blacklisted. In addition, the blacklisting related features such
as URL blacklisted number are also considered as a significant input for training the
classifier [43, 173,174].
Performance : Based on the SVM algorithm, the spam detection method which
included the input of blacklisting related features achieved the F1-measure of 87.6%
[174]. Besides, by applying the blacklisting method to block malicious URLs, the
maximum performance could reach 98.29% in practice [63].
Pros and cons : In the real world, blacklist is the most commonly used technique
for malicious information defense. However, spammers frequently update the features
and appearances of spam. According to [63, 95], about 90% of clicks on spam URLs
in Twitter happen within the first 2 days. However, averagely, it takes 4 days for
the blacklist to include the new spam URLs. This leads to a big time delay for the
blacklists to catch up with the updates of frequently changing spam tweets. Therefore,
the performance can hardly meet the expectation of spam defenders to timely capture
all the Twitter spam, particularly zero-day spam. It has been reported that the
performance of blacklisting technique will decrease around 10% per day during the
time lag [63]. Moreover, the abuse of shortened URLs also disables the performance of
blacklisting techniques because signatures of malicious Twitter spam are sometimes
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concealed by shortened URLs.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this chaper, we have discussed a series of Twitter spam detection methods, partic-
ularly the most recent ones which were published in the past three years. As we can
see from the taxonomy and literature review parts, the majority of current methods
mainly rely on machine learning based techniques (e.g. supervised or unsupervised)
to identify Twitter spamming activities. Among these machine learning based meth-
ods, the major differences are about how and where to collect features. Therefore, our
literature review is organised by the categories that are divided according to different
feature selection methods. For example, readers can find out the detection methods
based on syntax analysis, feature statistics and blacklists in Section 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4,
respectively. We believe this brand-new view of angle at the state-of-art of Twitter
spam detection will help readers capture the core challenges and develop promising
solutions in this field.
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Chapter 3
Comparative Study on Twitter
Spam Detection
In this chapter, we will compare typical Twitter spam detection methods from several
angles such as features and performance. As the blacklisting techniques apply the
third party services to block spam, we mainly focus on the comparison of syntax
based methods and feature analysis based methods. From the experimental results,
we will have a quantitative understanding of the pros and cons of the existing spam
detection methods.
3.1 Introduction
For the purpose of empirical study, a 10-day ground-truth dataset was collected from
Twitter’s Streaming API [35]. The dataset contained more than 600 million tweets.
These tweets could be processed using JSON format, where each line of them was
considered as an object [20]. By this way, the features would be collected automat-
ically for each record in the dataset. To effectively label the raw tweets into spam
and non-spam, Trend Micro’s Web Reputation Service (WRS) [37] was used to detect
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Table 3.1: Sample Datasets
Dataset No Dataset Type Spam : Non-spam
1 Continuous 5k : 5k
2 Continuous 5k : 95k
3 Random 5k : 5k
4 Random 5k : 95k
the malicious URLs. The tweets which contained malicious URLs would be identified
as spam. Trend Micro WRS kept a large number of history URL reputations and
was updated timely. When it was used for real-time protection of website browsing,
the protection rate could reach 99.8% [35]. By using this service, over 6.5 million
spam tweets were detected from our ground-truth dataset which contained 600 mil-
lion tweets in total. Although manual labeling was more accurate, it was extremely
time-consuming.
We applied four sampled datasets to justify the performance evaluation as shown
in Table 3.1. We allocated the same number of spam and benign tweets. However, in
the real-world scenarios, there were only approximately 5% spam tweets in the overall
Twitter social network [63]. Therefore, we also utilised the datasets which have the
same real-world ratio of spam (e.g. Dataset 2 and 4). Furthermore, we randomly
and continuously sampled the datasets to explore the impact of dispersion on the
performance. Basically, we ran the experiments on Windows 10 operation system at
a server with Inter(R) Core(TM) i7 CPU of 12 GB.
In the following sections, we will present the details of comparative studies, four
metrics are adopted to quantify the performance of Twitter spam detection methods.
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Table 3.2: Comparison between key segment methods
Key Segment
K/U URL
[168] [146] [43] [173,174] [145] [92] [91]
Matching
√ √ √
Shortened URL
√ √ √ √ √ √
Clustering (Tweet)
√
Clustering (Account)
√
URL based Features
√ √ √
Performance
91.00% 94.50% 87.60% 94.14% 91.53% 93.11%
ACC N /A ACC F-M ACC ACC ACC
Note: K/U: Keywords/Username Pattern; ACC: Accuracy; F-M: F-measure.
Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 present the comparison results of URL based detection
methods and tweet content based detection methods. In Section 3.4 and Section 3.5,
we present the experiments result of the statistic information based detection methods
and social graph based methods, respectively. In Section 3.6, we conclude this chapter.
3.2 Comparing Methods in Key Segment Cate-
gory
3.2.1 Comparison of feature selection
Recent key segment methods are listed in Table 3.2 based on different functionality
categories. We can see that the majority of the methods are URL based. We further
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Table 3.3: Comparison of campaign categories in URL based methods (refer to [146]).
Feature Type Accuracy FP FN
Source URLs 89.74% 1.17% 19.38%
HTTP Headers 85.37% 1.23% 28.07%
HTML Content 85.32% 1.36% 28.04%
Initial URL 84.01% 1.14% 30.88%
Final URL 83.59% 2.34% 30.53%
IP (Geo/ASN) 81.52% 2.33% 34.66%
Page Links 75.72% 15.46% 37.68%
Redirects 71.93% 0.85% 55.37%
DNS 72.40% 25.77% 29.44%
Frame URLs 60.17% 0.33% 79.45%
Table 3.4: Comparison of classifiers in URL based methods (refer to [92]).
Classifier AUC Accuracy FP FN
L2R LR (primal) 90.00% 91.90% 1.56% 6.54%
L2R L2-loss SVC (dual) 89.95% 91.79% 1.49% 6.72%
L2R L2-loss SVC (primal) 89.73% 91.76% 1.50% 6.74%
L2R L1-loss SVC (dual) 90.28% 91.87% 1.13% 7.01%
L1R L2-loss SVC (primal) 89.84% 91.78% 1.56% 6.10%
L1R LR (primal) 90.07% 91.91% 1.27% 6.52%
L2R LR (dual) 90.20% 91.96% 1.54% 6.51%
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compare the methods in key segment categories according to their functionalities:
‘Matching’, ‘Shortened URL’, ‘Clustering (tweet and account)’ and ‘URL feature’.
‘Matching’ refers to searching the objective keyfield by retrieval methods such as
regular expression [147]. ‘Shortened URL’ refers to inspecting shortened URLs which
may be malicious links. We can see from Table 3.2 that almost all URL based spam
detection methods apply shortened URLs. ‘Clustering’ refers to gathering tweets or
accounts into different groups according to their embedded URLs as well as the text
description. The last functionality mainly focuses on detecting the features for URLs,
like lexical attributes. By training the features through machine learning algorithms,
the classifier can be produced to identify the unsolicited URLs. Therefore, the tweets
corresponding to those URLs will be categorised as spam.
Evaluation and Results : Different key segment methods may have different
requirements of datasets. They can hardly be examined in an identical dataset. More-
over, it is unfair to compare the performance of key segment methods if methods run
in different datasets and with varied configurations. Therefore, in order to examine
the performance of key segment methods, we focus on the changes of performance
while employing different functionalities. This evaluation strategy will eliminate the
comparison errors caused by different datasets and testbeds.
The works [91, 92, 145] adopted ‘URL based features’ and ‘Shortened URL’ in
Twitter spam detection. As shown in Table 3.2, the work [145] outperformed the
other two methods in terms of Accuracy (94.14% vs. 91.53% and 93.11%). Moreover,
the Keyword/Username pattern methods (refer to 2.2.1) only applied the ‘Matching’
feature. Compared to the URL based methods [91,92,145], the performance decreased
to 91.00% (the difference is 94.14%− 91.00% = 3.14%). In fact, when more features
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Table 3.5: Twelve Statistical Features Used in [35]
Number Notation Description
1 account age The age (days) of an account since its creation until the time
of sending the most recent tweet.
2 no follower The number of followers of this twitter user.
3 no following The number of followings/friends of this twitter user.
4 no userfavourites The number of favourites this twitter user received.
5 no lists The number of lists this twitter user added.
6 no tweets The number of tweets this twitter user sent.
7 no retweets The number of retweets this tweet.
8 no hashtag The number of hashtags included in this tweet.
9 no usermention The number of user mentions included in this tweet.
10 no urls The number of URLs included in this tweet.
11 no char The number of characters in this tweet.
12 no digits The number of digits in this tweet.
were involved into the detection such as in the work [43], the performance would
be slightly improved (the difference was 94.50% − 94.14% = 0.36%). In terms of
F-measure, the works [173,174] achieved the performance of 87.60%.
3.2.2 Studying the Performance of Classifiers
The URL features and classifiers are two important factors to the performance of
URL based detection methods. In this subsection, we specifically study and compare
the performance from the classifier angle of view.
Evaluation and Results : For comparison, we select two typical URL based
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methods [92, 146], one for URL features and another one for classifiers. The results
are shown in Table 3.3 and 3.4, respectively. First, Thomas et al. categorised URL
features into several groups, and then identified the groups which were more influen-
tial than the left [146]. It was found that the group of source URLs was the most
influential one. By feeding groups of URL features into classifiers one after another,
we found that the spam detection which only relied on the group of source URL
features could achieve the Accuracy of 89.74%. Comparatively, the lowest Accuracy
was only 60.17% when the group of frame URL features was exclusively fed into the
classifier. We then come to the comparison on the performance of different classifiers.
Seven classifiers were studied in terms of AUC, Accuracy, False Positive (FP) and
False Negative (FN). We could find in Table 3.4 that the performance of different
classifiers did not differ from each other too much (i.e. difference < 5%). In partic-
ular, the L2-regularised L1-loss SVC classifier achieved the highest AUC and lowest
FP among various classifiers.
3.3 Comparing Methods in Tweet Content Cate-
gory
In this section, we carry out comparative studies to demonstrate the performance
of tweet content based methods. We mainly focus on the differences of performance
caused by content based features. Because the content based features and statistic
features can be quantified for a unified comparison, we will take typical methods from
these two categories for comparison. More concretely, we select n-gram [26] as the
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Figure 3.1: Input dimensionality reduction of tweet content methods
Figure 3.2: Input dimensionality reduction of feature statistics methods
typical tweet content based method and the work in [35] as the typical statistic infor-
mation based method. Based on the same dataset, the text of tweets is transferred
into the vector format by applying the n-gram technique. We set the character-based
3-gram tokens as parameters, and then each tweet is mapped to a highly dimen-
sional space in which each dimension is a token with length 3. To make the features
comparable, both of them are transferred into two-dimension vectors using PCA Di-
mensionality Reduction [19]. The details are explained as followings.
The PCA dimensionality reduction will map original high-dimension space into a
space with lower dimension [19]. The maximal variance after mapping can be achieved
as
maxW
1
m− 1
m∑
i=1
(W T (Xi −X))2,
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Figure 3.3: Performance Evaluation Compared on five classifiers in Dataset 1. De-
cision Tree is used in [8, 32, 35, 43, 52, 90, 100, 136, 162, 164]; Random Forest is used
in [32, 35, 43, 100, 138, 162, 164]; Bayes Net is used in [32, 35, 43, 136, 162, 164]; Naive
Bayes is used in [32,35,152]; Decorate is used in [90,162,164].
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Figure 3.4: Performance Evaluation Compared on Five Classifiers in Dataset 2. De-
cision Tree is used in [8, 32, 35, 43, 52, 90, 100, 136, 162, 164]; Random Forest is used
in [32, 35, 43, 100, 138, 162, 164]; Bayes Net is used in [32, 35, 43, 136, 162, 164]; Naive
Bayes is used in [32,35,152]; Decorate is used in [90,162,164].
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Figure 3.5: Performance Evaluation Compared on Five Classifiers in Dataset 3. De-
cision Tree is used in [8, 32, 35, 43, 52, 90, 100, 136, 162, 164]; Random Forest is used
in [32, 35, 43, 100, 138, 162, 164]; Bayes Net is used in [32, 35, 43, 136, 162, 164]; Naive
Bayes is used in [32,35,152]; Decorate is used in [90,162,164].
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Figure 3.6: Performance Evaluation Compared on Five Classifiers in Dataset 4. De-
cision Tree is used in [8, 32, 35, 43, 52, 90, 100, 136, 162, 164]; Random Forest is used
in [32, 35, 43, 100, 138, 162, 164]; Bayes Net is used in [32, 35, 43, 136, 162, 164]; Naive
Bayes is used in [32,35,152]; Decorate is used in [90,162,164].
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Figure 3.7: Euclidean Distance Performance (Numerical Features are Listed in Table
3.5 [35]). (A) Dataset 1; (B) Dataset 2; (C) Dataset 3;(D) Dataset 4
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Figure 3.8: Manhattan Distance Performance (Numerical Features are Listed in Table
3.5 [35]). (A) Dataset 1; (B) Dataset 2; (C) Dataset 3;(D) Dataset 4
wherein m is the number of samples, Xi is the vector representation of the ith input,
and X is the average of all input vectors. Considering W as a matrix that contains
all the vectors, the optimal object function is expressed by
minW tr(W
TAW )(s.t.W TW = I),
where tr means the trace of matrix W , and A is the covariance matrix which can be
obtained by
A =
1
m− 1
m∑
i=1
(Xi −X)(Xi −X)T .
With an eigenvalue k (k = 2), the vector Y with two-level space achieved by
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Figure 3.9: Chebyshev Distance Performance (Numerical Features are Listed in Table
3.5 [35]). (A) Dataset 1; (B) Dataset 2; (C) Dataset 3;(D) Dataset 4
dimensionality reduction is
Y = W TX.
Evaluation and Results : The resultant two dimensions are shown in Fig. 3.1,
and 3.2, respectively. It can be found that the distinction of the features derived
from tweet content is more apparent. The features are represented by the red (spam)
or black (benign) dots. Compared to statistic features, the dots for tweet content
occupy a much bigger area. While the dots for feature statistics are distributed in
a narrow angle without clear boundaries between two colours (spam and non-spam).
There are two distinct parts in Fig. 3.1. Although there is a small mixed area for
Dataset 1 and 3 in Fig. 3.1, it has shown apparent differences on the representation
of features.
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3.4 Comparing Methods in Statistic Information
Category
In this subsection, we continue to compare the statistic information based methods
from two parts: classifiers and features. The first part includes feature extraction,
which identifies the attributes of the spam or spammers and convert them into a
vector format. The second part employs a set of machine learning classifiers with
specific features to compare the performance.
3.4.1 Studying the Performance of Classifiers
Because statistic features can be extracted from our ground-truth datasets, we will
carry out empirical analysis to demonstrate and compare the performance of various
classifiers used in this category. Accordingly, we collect twelve popular features in
this category (as shown in Table 3.5) for the input of classifiers [35]. The classifiers
have been implemented in Weka [65] integrated in the KNIME [4] platform. For each
experiment, we will apply cross validation to obtain the results in terms of Accuracy,
Recall, Precision and F-measure. There are five classifiers as well as four sampled
datasets (refer to Table 3.1) involved in this part of analysis. The comparison results
are shown in Fig. 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6, respectively.
Evaluation and Results: The Random Forest method performed the best all
the time, with all the results close to 100%. Likewise, the performance of Decorate
classifier was slightly weak but still ranked the second. However, after we have applied
randomly selected datasets, the performance value dropped dramatically. The Recall
and F-measure only remained less than 80% in Dataset 4. On the contrary, the worst
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classifier was Naive Bayes. The average performance for this method could achieve
around 60% according to the four evaluation criteria in 5K:5K datasets (i.e. the
number of spammers = the number of non-spammers). While in the 5K:95K datasets
(i.e. the number of spammers << the number of non-spammers), the Precision and
F-measure were not higher than 15%. In addition, we can see from Fig. 3.6 that
the randomly sampled unbiased dataset provided the worst performance compared
to other datasets.
3.4.2 Studying the Performance of Features
We further compare the typical statistical features by using distance metrics [111].
The features and class values will first be transferred into a set of vectors, and then the
correlation of each feature and classification can be quantified by the distance metrics.
For the convenience of readers, we further introduce the ‘Distance Performance’ to
present the evaluation results. If the distance of two vectors (denoted by D) is shorter,
the ‘Distance Performance’ DP = 1
D
will be higher (i.e. the corresponding features
have better performance). The twelve features are presented in Table 3.5 for the
empirical study. We will explain the details of the method that convert features into
vectors and the usage of various distances as followings.
We first convert each feature into a vector format which can be expressed as
follows:
a = (x11, x12, . . . , x1n),
where n represents the dimension number of the vector, which is also the number of
records in the dataset, and each dimension is the feature value of each record.
To represent the classification of spam and non-spam, the spam is labeled as 1,
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and the benign records are labeled as 0. Similarly, it is denoted as:
b = (x21, x22, . . . , x2n),
wherein b contains values of 0 or 1.
Then, we apply three traditional distance calculation methods to achieve the dis-
tance between the classification vector and each feature representation in the twelve
attributes. The methods include Euclidean Distance [45], Manhattan Distance [23]
and Chebyshev Distance [79] which will be explained below.
Euclidean Distance is the most direct length as the crow files between two vectors.
It can be calculated by
DE =
√√√√ n∑
k=1
(x1k − x2k)2.
Manhattan Distance does not calculate the direct length, but applies the idea of
city block. The route between the two points is either vertical or horizontal and can
be denoted as
DM =
n∑
k=1
|x1k − x2k|.
Chebyshev Distance is the maximum length of the difference between the coordi-
nate values of two points. It is expressed as
DC = lim
i→∞
(
n∑
k=1
|x1k − x2k|i)1/i.
To compare the contributes of the features, we apply the Distance Performance
DP instead of distance D (including DE,DM and DC) to evaluate each feature.
Evaluation and Results: The results of the three distance methods are shown
in Fig. 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9. We summarise three points from the results. The first
point : Compared to the results in 5K:95K datasets, it is shown that the performance
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contributed by the feature ‘no urls’ was larger than by the feature ‘no usermention’
in 5K:5K datasets, in terms of Euclidean Distance. The second point : We can
find similar phenomenon in Manhattan Distance. In addition, the performance of
‘no hashtag’ climbed almost twice as the performance of ‘no usermention’ in Dataset
1, while it was slightly lower in other datasets. The method was also influenced
by the dataset type (refers to Table 3.1). It can be found that the performance of
‘no usermention’ decreased to almost the lowest among the three significant features
in the continuous sampled datasets. However, the performance reached the highest in
the non-continuous datasets. The third point : The performance in terms of Cheby-
shev Distance had a minor fluctuation in different datasets. The ‘no urls’ feature
contributed the most throughout all the datasets. Overall, the features ‘no hashtag’,
‘no usermention’ and ‘no urls’ had larger DP values. The result also suggested that
the tweet features played a more important role in feature statistics methods. Be-
sides, the feature ‘no digits’ achieved around one third of the overall performance of
tweet features (see details in Fig. 3.7 and 3.8, features {8,9,10} vs. feature 12).
3.5 Comparing Methods in Social Graph Category
We show the modus operandi of social graph based methods in Table 3.6. It can be
seen from the table that there are mainly two kinds of social graph features (account
related features and graph structure based features). For the first kind, each node in
social graph represents a Twitter account. Accordingly, the contacts among Twitter
users form a directed graph. For example, the indegree of a node represents the
number of followers, while the outdegree represents the number of followings (friends)
in the social graph. The second kind of features focuses more on the structure of the
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social graph. For example, the graph density feature denotes the ratio of the edges
to the number of all possible edges existed in the graph. We summarise the features
adopted by each method in Table 3.6.
Evaluation and Results : It is challenging to build a complete social graph with
increasing number of Twitter users. Current social graph based methods used differ-
ent datasets and measurements in order to evaluate their performance. Because those
datasets are generally unbiased in constructing structures of social graphs (refers to
Section 3.6.1), the direct comparison based on different datasets is unfair. Therefore,
we make a basic performance comparison among the existing techniques using dis-
tinguished features. The results are also shown in Table 3.6. We can see that that
social graph based methods have similar performance. Almost all methods achieved
the performance around 90% in terms of F-measure, TPR or precision, except the
work [71] (only achieved 69.8% TPR). The reason is that the work [71] only selected
one social graph feature (outdegree), which was far from being enough. The social
graph based methods either choose account related features or graph structure based
features. However, according to the results in Table 3.6, the difference in feature se-
lection did not lead to significant changes in the detection performance. In addition,
there are a few studies that cannot quantify their performance. Therefore, we marked
their performance by N/A in the ‘Performance’ row (e.g. Yang et al.’s work [163]).
3.6 Conclusion and Open Issues
This chapter provides comparative studies on various Twitter spam detection meth-
ods. By extracting the features from tweets and accounts in the ground truth dataset,
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machine learning based methods adopt a set of algorithms as binary classifiers. Ac-
cordingly, we compare the performance of different classifiers. Our comparison con-
cludes that most classifiers have no significant differences in detection performance
except some specific scenarios (e.g. refers to the Precision plot in Fig. 3.4). We also
analyse and compare the impact of various features to the detection performance.
We adopt PCA and a set of distance metrics to measure the impact. The results
suggest different features may lead to dramatic difference in performance (e.g. refers
to Fig. 3.1 and 3.7). Although the simplest method is blacklisting technique, we do
not involve it in the comparison because the working processes of current blacklisting
techniques are essentially the same to each other. The major differences refer to the
speed of collecting malicious URLs by other modules or cybersecurity systems. This
part of discussion is out of the scope of our survey.
There are still several open issues for existing methods. In the following subsec-
tions, we will introduce each open issue in details.
3.6.1 Open Issue 1: Data Collection
In the real-world scenarios, it is hard to collect an intact dataset and label it as ground
truth. Twitter provides APIs which can only support 1% sampling rate among all
the posts from users [6]. Therefore, they cannot be used for real-time spam detection.
For this reason, many studies collect tweets and corresponding account information
from online platforms such as the information groups related to the same topic by
crawling techniques. But this kind of datasets is biased as it only covers some specific
clusters of tweets or accounts information. It is challenging to acquire an unbiased
dataset.
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3.6.2 Open Issue 2: Data Labeling
In Twitter spam detection, the tweets collected will be labeled as spam or non-
spam, and the accounts will be identified as criminals or legitimate users. The most
accurate method is to label the data manually. However, it is time-consuming to
label millions of tweets. The widely adopted labeling method is to use blacklists
which have recorded history and current malicious URLs. The key of this method is
to detect suspicious URLs to detect spam. However, as discussed before, there may
exist detection errors in blacklisting techniques (refers to Section 2.4). Therefore,
even though the blacklisting technique is considered as an effective labeling method,
the datasets cannot be labeled accurately. This leads to the errors in the classifier
performance evaluation.
3.6.3 Open Issue 3: Spam Drift
Spam drift is a serious problem when applying feature statistics methods [33]. It
is defined as a problem that Twitter spam drifts throughout its life cycle in the
statistical processes. Generally speaking, the datasets are collected across several
consecutive days. After the features are extracted, it can be found that the spam
features fluctuate significantly while the non-spam features remained stable [100]. As
a result, the classifier trained by the past data cannot be utilised to detect spam in
the new dataset since the spam features always change along with the time.
3.6.4 Open Issue 4: Imbalanced Dataset
The class imbalance problem has been overlooked in most previous studies. This
problem widely exists in real-world Twitter data. According to [63], there are only
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approximately 5% tweets are spam. The uneven distribution between spam and non-
spam classes largely decreases the classification performance. The reason is that
traditional machine learning techniques usually have better performance to classify
the majority class than the minority class. In fact, the datasets used by current
techniques are almost all imbalanced. From the previous comparative study, we can
see that the classifiers performed better in the biased datasets than unbiased, as
shown in Fig. 3.3, 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6. For instance, the F-measure for Naive Bayes
reached around 70% in Dataset 1 and 3, but decreased to only one seventh of it (10%
F-measure) in Dataset 2 and 4. Likewise, in the 1:19 (the ratio of spam tweets to
non-spam tweets) datasets, the Precision of Bayes Net was reduced to half of it in
the 1:1 datasets.
3.6.5 Open Issue 5: Data Fabrication
Data fabrication refers to the fact that the data used for training classifiers is easy to
be manipulated. Spammers usually try to evade the detection system by pretending to
be benign accounts [100]. To avoid being identified, they generally imitate legitimate
users’ behaviours such as the number and frequency of posting tweets. Moreover,
spammers can apply sophisticated social engineering techniques to manipulate infor-
mation [137]. For example, criminal accounts have applied finite-state machines to
develop the spam template such as a simple sentence with a shortened URL [137].
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Chapter 4
A Deep Learning Based Detection
on Spam Drift Issue
Twitter Spam is a critical problem and current solution is mainly about machine
learning based detection. However, recent studies found that the spam features are
continuously changing day by day (called Spam Drift problem), which may signif-
icantly affect the performance of the detection. In this chapter, we carried out a
real-data driven study to explored the Spam Drift problem and its impact to machine
learning based detection, and a deep learning based Twitter spam detection method
was proposed.
4.1 Introduction
Current Twitter spam detection methods are mainly based on machine learning algo-
rithms and can be divided into three main categories: syntax-based, feature statistic
and URL-based methods. Among the state-of-art methods, the feature statistic cate-
gory took the dominant place [14]. The rationale of this mainstream technique can be
exhibited as two stages. A series of features are firstly extracted for statistics such as
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hashtag number and digit number in a tweet. Since more than ten features are gener-
ally selected, each collected tweet can be represented as a high-dimension vector [35].
These vectors will secondly be fed into classic machine learning algorithms (e.g. Ran-
dom Forest and Decision Tree) to develop a model for spam classification [59].
There are plenty of works which utilised this method and achieved the real time
detection rate of over 90% [14]. However, Liu et al. and Chen et al. found the
problem of spam drift which can affect the performance of this method [30,100]. The
spam drift problem is that the spam features fluctuate with the day changes, so that
the model generated based on historical tweets cannot be used to predict real time
data.
4.2 Datasets Collection and Preparation
In this study, we collected a ten-day ground-truth dataset from Twitter’s Streaming
API [32]. This dataset contained more than 600 million tweets with URLs. It was
revealed that most spammers were keen on posting unsolicited links in their messages
to redirect victims to malicious websites or malware downloading [10]. Moreover, Liu
et al. manually labelled thousands of ground-truth tweets and noticed that only a
small part of spam messages did not include URLs [100]. Therefore, we only consid-
ered the tweets with embedding URLs in our dataset. The dataset was labelled by
employing the URL-detection technique provided by Trend Micro. Trend Micro WRS
kept a large number of history URL reputations and was updated timely. When it
was used for real-time protection of website browsing, the detection rate of it could
reach 99.8% [32]. By using this service, over 6.5 million spam tweets were detected
from our ground-truth dataset which contained 600 million tweets. Although manual
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labelling was more accurate, it was extremely time consuming.
To evaluate our proposed Twitter spam detection method, we extracted 1,376,206
spam tweets and 673,836 non-spam messages excluding blank lines. We wrote a Java
program to process the raw text including removing the blank lines and assigning
labels classified as spam or non-spam.
There are three main resources in the procedure of feature extraction: tweet, ac-
count and social graph. Yang et al. generated several features based on the structure
of social graph such as Betweenness Centrality [162]. But generally, it is time and
resource consuming to construct the huge social network and not feasible in real-
world scenarios. For this reason, we mainly focus on the features about tweet and
account. These tweets could be processed using JSON format, where each line of
them was considered as an object [32]. Then, the features were extracted directly
through statistics. Totally, we refined 14 light-weight features which are illustrated
in Table 4.1.
4.3 Spam Drift Investigation
We analysed the spam and non-spam feature distribution for ten days and visualised
four representative features in Fig. 4.1 and 4.2 (i.e. drift and non-drift examples). It
is shown in Fig. 4.1 that for the features of ‘number of characters’ and ‘account age’,
the distribution in spam fluctuated dramatically and could not be predicted when
the day changed. However, the features for non-spam tweets remained stable and the
mean values stayed in a line in ten days. On the contrary, according to Fig. 4.2, there
was no significant drift in terms of the features ‘number of followings’ and ‘number of
followers’. The distribution of each single day was scattered but the overall range did
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Table 4.1: 14 Statistical Features
Number Notation Drift Description
1 account age
√
The age (days) of an account since its cre-
ation until the time of sending the most re-
cent tweet.
2 no follower × The number of followers of a user.
3 no following × The number of followings/friends of a user.
4 no userfavourites × The number of favourites a user received.
5 no tweetfavourites × The number of favourites a tweet received.
6 no lists × The number of lists a user added.
7 no tweets × The number of tweets a user sent.
8 no retweets × The number of retweets in a tweet.
9 no hashtag × The number of hashtags in a tweet.
10 no usermention × The number of user mentions in a tweet.
11 no urls × The number of URLs included in a tweet.
12 no char
√
The number of characters in a tweet.
13 no digits
√
The number of digits in a tweet.
14 k score
√
The Klout score of a user.
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Figure 4.1: Example of drift features. The features of ‘number of characters’ and
‘account age’ are drifting during the 10-day period.
not change evidently over time (i.e. the means were almost zeros excluding the values
beyond the range). Therefore, we can see that not all the features have the problem
of spam drift. We gathered the whole distributions of the 14 features during ten days,
and collected the corresponding drift result. From Table 4.1, we can conclude that
given a series of features, only a few of them experience spam drift.
Spam drift is mainly caused by data fabrication produced by social engineering
techniques [160]. Sophisticated criminals usually manipulate tweets according to some
specific syntax, but they change the template frequently in order not to be detected
[34]. Thus, the value range of the drifted features will fluctuate significantly with the
update of the criminal machines for generating spam. For example, in Table 4.1, we
can find that the drifted features are available for easy manipulation. However, the
features such as ‘number of followers’ and ‘number of followings’ which are hard to
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Figure 4.2: Example of non-drift features. The features of ‘number of followings‘ and
‘number of followers‘ remain stable in in both spam and non-spam tweets during the
10-day period.
be manipulated are identified as non-drift.
4.4 Experiments and Impact Evaluation
We then make an empirical study to deeply explore the impact of spam drift on
machine leaning based Twitter spam detection.
In the experiment, for each day, a balanced 200,000-tweet sample dataset was
collected correspondingly from the labelled ten-day dataset. Basically, we ran the
experiments on Windows 10 operation system at a server with Inter(R) Core(TM) i7
CPU of 12 GB.
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Figure 4.3: Recall and Precision for spam and non-spam tweets throughout ten days.
In the classification procedure, DT (Decision Tree) and RT (Random Forest) algo-
rithms were applied to generate models based on day1 data and real time data.
4.4.1 Performance Metrics
Generally, to evaluate the performance of Twitter spam detection, we use Accuracy,
Recall (Sensitivity), Precision and F-measure to measure the capability [153].
Traditionally, the spam classification result is represented as the confusion matrix
as demonstrated in Table 4.2 (we consider spam as positive). TP (True Positive) is the
number of spam tweets which are correctly classified as spam, and FP (False Positive)
represents the amount of non-spam tweets which are wrongly labelled as spam. On
the contrary, TN (True Negative) refers to the quantity of non-spam tweets which
are exactly considered as non-spam, while FN (False Negative) denotes the number
of spam messages which are treated as spam by mistake.
Accuracy means the ratio of tweets identified correctly to all tweets. It is expressed
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Table 4.2: Confusion Matrix
Predicted
Actual Spam Non-spam
Spam TP FP
Non-spam FN TN
Table 4.3: Recall and Precision for Spam and Non-spam
Recall Precision
Spam SR ( TP
TP+FN
) SP ( TP
TP+FP
)
Non-spam NR ( TN
TN+FP
) NP ( TN
TN+FN
)
as
Accuracy =
TP + TN
TP + FP + FN + TN
.
Recall (Sensitivity) is defined as the ratio of correctly classified spam in total real
spam, as
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
.
Precision is defined as true projected spam to classified spam. It can be obtained
by
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
.
F-measure is the harmonic mean of Precision and Recall, and it can be calculated
as follow:
F −measure =2 ∗ Precision ∗Recall
Precision+Recall
=
2TP
2TP + FP + FN
.
In our experiment, we applied Recall and Precision to evaluate the performance of
the classification method. Accordingly, we can obtain the Recall and Precision matrix
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for both spam and non-spam (see Table 4.3). In this table, when we calculate Recall
and Precision for non-spam, the positive and negative is swapped. For example, TN
represents the number of non-spam tweets which are correctly classified as non-spam.
There is a gap between industry and theoretical research on the mo-
tivation of performance improvement. In real-world scenarios, security service
customers are zero-tolerant to FP, in contrast to FN. To achieve better FP has been
prioritised as the paramount principle in cyber security industries. Therefore, the
basic requirement is that non-spam tweets should not be classified as spam (i.e. FP
should be zero). As for the experiment in our analysis, the high enough NR (Non-
spam Recall) and SP (Spam Precision) can satisfy the basic requirement of the in-
dustry. Meanwhile, SR (Spam Recall) and NP (Non-spam Precision) represent the
spam detection rate and they are more treated as the classification performance.
4.4.2 Impact Analysis on Classifiers
We applied machine learning algorithms as the classification methods after feature
extraction. It was reported that Decision Tree (DT) and Random Forest (RF)
achieved better performance than using other traditional algorithm such as Naive
Bayes (NB) [81, 100]. For this reason, DT and RF were selected in our experiment.
We ran 100 times for each experiment, and computed the average, maximum and
minimum values.
In order to explore the impact of spam drift, we constructed two kinds of models
based on day1 data and real time data separately. Day1 Model : when we applied
day1 data for modelling, 60% of it was randomly selected as training data for all the
ten days, and the whole sample dataset for each day was used for testing. Real Time
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Model : in contrast, the real time detection partition the data into 60% training data
and 40% testing data on every day basis.
4.4.3 Result
Fig. 4.3 shows the result of Recall and Precision for spam and non-spam detection
on ten days respectively, and there is a one-to-one correspondence between the four
sub-figures and the matrix in Table 4.3.
We can see that the outperformance of Real Time Model only occurred in SR and
NP. By employing both RF and DT, the result of Real Time Model was significantly
better than employing Day1 Model. Even the worst performance of Real Time Model
was better than the maximum result of Day1 Model. Take SR result as an example,
the mean for Real Time Model was approximately 30% higher than Day1 Model.
Therefore, spam drift could bring significant effects on spam detection performance.
4.5 Deep Learning Technique in Spam detection
In order to avoid feature drift and fabrication, we focus more on syntax-based analysis
on tweets. WordVector [84] and deep learning [85] techniques will be employed to the
analysis of tweets’ syntax to extract text-based features. These features will then be
fed into several traditional classifiers. Because our method mainly focuses on syntax-
based features (i.e. non-statistical analysis) on tweets, the detection can avoid above
feature drift and fabrication issues, which as discussed before, are mainly caused by
statistical features collection.
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Figure 4.4: New Twitter classification workflow based on deep learning
This section describes a new Twitter spam detection technique including vector-
based feature training through WordVector techniques and binary classifier built by
multiple machine learning algorithms. Figure 4.4 shows the workflow of distinguishing
Twitter spam through our new method.
We implement a series of empirical and theoretical analysis to demonstrate the
outperformance of our method to the state-of-art. All the experiments and theoretical
analysis are based on the10-day Twitter dataset which has been labeled spam and
non-spam as ground truth.
In the empirical analysis, we first compare the performance of different classifiers
after the pre-processes via WordVector technique. We then compare our classification
performance to those which also analyse the content of tweets. We further compare
the performance of our new method to current detection techniques which do not rely
on text analysis. The experiment results suggested that our proposed method was
better than all previous work in terms of accuracy (i.e. our method: F-measure ≈
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Figure 4.5: The procedure of learning document vector, where N represents the num-
ber of the words in a document
95%, while current methods: F-measure≈ 87% .
4.5.1 Detection Framework
Different from the conventional detection, we select attributes according to the con-
tent of tweets using Word2Vec instead of traditional feature collection and genera-
tion [36].
First of all, we apply Word2Vec to map each word in the whole dataset into
corresponding multidimensional vector. It employs a two-level neural network, where
Huffman technique is used as hierarchical softmax to allocate codes to frequent words
[110]. It improves the efficiency of training model, since high-frequency words can be
processed fast [84]. By applying this technique, the word vector-based representation
is trained through the stochastic gradient descent and the gradient is achieved by back
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propagation. What is more, optimal vectors are obtained for each word by CBOW
or Skip-gram [110].
Furthermore, Doc2Vec training model is used to assign one vector representing
every tweet using Paragraph Vector modelling [84]. Based on Word2Vec, a tweet-
length document vector is trained by the combination of word vectors and unique
document vector per record. By repeating the procedures, each optimal document-
based vector can be learned (as shown in Figure 4.5).
After document vectors with high-level dimension learned, they are treated as the
input features of several machine learning techniques, such as the Random Forest or
Neural Network, along with the label of spam/non-spam.
The document representation ~d can be defined as
~D = (d1, d2, . . . , dM)
where M is the dimension number of document vectors, d is the value for each
level of it.
By adding the variable binary label, the tweet can be presented as
~t = ( ~D, label)
where t represents the concatenate vector, and label is the tweet flag of spam or
non-spam. Thus, the training dataset T is expressed as
T = (~t1,~t2, . . . ,~tN)
where N is the number of tweets in training dataset. With a training dataset,
a binary classification function C applying traditional machine learning methods is
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Table 4.4: Data Samples
Dataset No Dataset Type Spam : Non-spam
1 Continuous 5K:5K
2 Continuous 5K:95K
3 Random 5K:5K
4 Random 5K:95K
generated to predict attributes of testing data without labels, with a label vector ~L
in the order of corresponding messages. It is demonstrated as
~L = (l1, l2, . . . , ln) = C( ~D1, ~D2, . . . , ~Dn)
where n is the tweet number in the testing data.
4.5.2 Performance Evaluation and Comparison Analysis
In the subsection, we first demonstrate our performance when we adopt several differ-
ent classifiers in our method based on the ground-truth datasets. We then compare
our experimental outcomes to another two categories of existing classification methods
(i.e. text-based and non-text-based).
In order to determine the impact of dataset properties on performance, 4 sub-
datasets were selected continuously or randomly. The 4 samples are shown in Table
4.4. In theory, the ratio of spam to non-spam is 1:1, like Dataset 1 and Dataset 3.
However, in the real world, there are approximately 95% tweets are benign posts [64].
Thus, we set the amount of non-spam to be 19 times as much as spam in Dataset 2
and Dataset 4.
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Figure 4.6: Performance Value of our detection method based on deep learning based
on 4 sampled datasets. (A) Recall; (B) Precision; (C) F-measure; (D) Accuracy
To implement the whole workflow of our innovative detection technique, we built
classification process on KNIME Analysis Platform [18]. In the workflow, at the first
layer, the WordVector Training Model was set as Doc2Vec, along with the learning
rate of 2% and the layer size to be 200. Besides, another step consisted of several dif-
ferent traditional machine learning models (one is utilised each time). To avoid error,
we looped each experiment for 100 times and calculate the mean of each performance
metric. For each run of experiments, the dataset was independently split into 60%
training data and 40% testing data.
Comparison of Classifiers
In this subsection, we evaluated the performance of our work through the comparisons
among three different classification algorithms. The input complied with the form of
vectors, and they were trained by WordVector technique in a deep learning style in
the four sampling datasets. The comparison results will suggest the optimal classifier
that can be used in our method (i.e. internal comparison). The list of classifiers is
shown in Table 4.5.
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Table 4.5: Text-based Detection Using Deep Learning (Internal)
Detection Method Description
Random Forest Classification applying the Random Forest algorithm
[25] to process the word representation trained by Word-
Vector Technique.
Neural Network (MLP) Detection method using the neural network Multi-Layer
Perceptron (MLP) [56] with input extracted by Word-
Vector. There could be several hidden layers between
the input and output layer. MLP classifier is imple-
mented based on Backpropagation algorithm [158] .
In the training procedure, gradient descent is applied
and the gradients are obtained by Backpropagation.This
method is competent in learning non-linear model.
Decision Tree Employing a greedy splitting method to build a tree [48],
along with WordVector pre-processing.
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of performance values with traditional text-based detection
approaches based on 4 sampled datasets. (A) Recall; (B) Precision; (C) F-measure;
(D) Accuracy
As shown in Figure 4.6, all the three algorithms performed well. Almost all
performance values were higher than 80%, and most of them were more than 90%.
As represented in Figure 4.6, the technique of Random Forest outperformed the other
two methods all the time on Precision and Accuracy, while they were no more than
5% higher than MLP. Moreover, MLP achieved the best Recall over time. For the
F-measure, MLP achieved highest performance in Dataset 2 and 4, and the second
best performance in Dataset 1 and 3. Since the ratio of spam on Dataset 2 and 4
was similar to the real world, it was meaningful to achieve the highest F-measure in
them. Besides, there was no significant difference among the four performance metrics
(all reach 95% averagely). Because we mainly focused on F-measure to validate the
performance of our method, in the following, we selected MLP as our classification
method along with WordVector technique to compare to other approaches as listed
in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7.
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Table 4.6: Traditional Text-based Detection
Detection Method Description
Palladian The text classifier working with n-
grams which are a series of tokens for
the length [149].
Complementary Naive Bayes Multinomial Naive Bayes model which
can detect words distribution in docu-
ments [127].
Complementary Naive Bayes (Frequencies) Complementary one with term fre-
quency [149].
Comparison with Syntax-based Methods
We compare our method to three existing text-based techniques list in Table 4.6. We
present the differences among different text-based methods in Figure 4.7. As shown
in Figure 4.7, our proposed method using MLP performed better than all current
work in terms of Recall, F-measure and Accuracy. For Precision, the performance
of our method was about 25% higher than the second best result in Dataset 2 but
5% less than the best result in other datasets. In terms of F-measure, MLP provided
similar results as other classifiers in Dataset 1 and 3, with only less than 5% difference.
Nevertheless, MLP’s results in Dataset 2 and 4 showed a distinct advantage. It was
around 15% higher than Palladian and Naive Bayes, and it even achieved double F-
measure of Naive Bayes (Frequencies) in Dataset 2 and 4. Overall, it outperformed
all the others.
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Figure 4.8: Comparison of performance values with feature-based methods based on
4 sampled datasets. (A) Recall; (B) Precision; (C) F-measure; (D) Accuracy
Comparison with Feature-based Methods
We further compare our method to other feature-based detection methods list in
Table 4.7. The performance of our method in all datasets was better than other
feature-based methods almost all the time. In particular, as shown in Figure 4.8,
the F-measure of MLP was much higher than other methods, with averagely 30%
higher than Random Forest and almost nine times of Naive Bayes in Dataset 2 and
4. Besides, the F-measure of Decision Tree method achieved almost the same as our
method in Dataset 1. The F-measure results largely decreased when the Decision Tree
method ran in Dataset 4, and the performance decreased 10%–20% in Dataset 2 and
3. In addition, for the Recall metric, although MLP was slightly higher than Random
Forest and Decision Tree in 1:1 datasets (Dataset 1 and 3), it achieved almost twice of
them in 1:19 datasets. Meanwhile, the Recall of MLP was twice as high as Naive Bayes
in 1:1 datasets. The time changed to 9 in other datasets. All these results suggested
that MLP outperformed the existing feature statistics classifications significantly.
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Table 4.7: Feature-based Detection Supported by Machine Learning
Detection Method Description
Naive Bayes A two-layer classification method, with
one level representing the label of
spam/non-spam,and another including
a set of features [12]
Random Forest An anti-sensitive method, with an ex-
tra layer added [97]
Decision Tree (C4.5) A traditional machine learning tech-
nique with multiple retrieving and or-
dering [99]
Table 4.8: Impact of the Spam Ratio by Dataset 1 and 2 using MLP
Unit:% Recall Precision F-measure Accuracy
Dataset 1 93.48 95.04 94.25 94.30
Dataset 2 91.03 95.84 93.37 99.35
4.5.3 Result Discussion
Based on the above experiment results, our proposed method outperformed current
detection classifiers. The major difference from existing methods is about feature
selection processes. However, there are two factors that affects the classifier function
in terms of dataset: 1) the proportion of spam and non-spam and 2) the sample
dataset discretisation.
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Table 4.9: Impact on Sample Dataset Discretisation of Dataset 1 and 3 using MLP
Unit:% Recall Precision F-measure Accuracy
Dataset 1 93.48 95.04 94.25 94.30
Dataset 3 91.48 94.23 92.83 92.94
Impact of Spam Ratio
We show the impact of the spam ratio in Table 4.8. It can be found that with
the change of spam ratio, the performance of our proposed method remained stable.
The best one achieved 2.45% on Racall. Therefore, it affected other text-based or
non-text-based significantly. For example, as shown in Figure 4.7, for Naive Bayes
(Frequencies), F-measure in 1:19 (spam:non-spam) datasets was only half of the F-
measure result in 1:1 datasets. The decrease became more dramatic for its Precision,
from nearly 100% to around 35% when the datasets changed to 1:19 datasets. In Fig-
ure 4.8, there was a considerable change in F-measure for Random Forest, decreasing
from above 90% down to 60% in 1:1 datasets and 1:19 datasets respectively. For
these two datasets, the F-measure, Recall and Precision showed a similar trend, with
about 10%–20% less in 1:19 datasets. In addition, the Fmeasure of Naive Bayes was
averagely 60% in 1:1 datasets, but it became one fifth in 1:19 datasets.
Impact of Sample Dataset Discretisation
We further study the impact of sample dataset discretisation. The results are shown
in Table 4.9. It is found that with the change of the spam ratio, the performance of
our proposed method remained stable. The biggest difference was only 2% on Recall.
Accordingly, the performance in continuous datasets would be slightly better than
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randomly sampled datasets for all detection from Figure 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8. However,
there also existed a few remarkable changes. For instance, the Recall metrics increased
more than 20% for Palladian in non-continuous datasets (containing 100k tweets)
which have been demonstrated in Figure 4.7, while its Precision showed a different
trend by growing approximately 30%. At the same time, in Figure 4.8, except the
minor difference in F-measure of our proposed method, all of the existing methods
(i.e. for vertical comparison) showed averagely 10% descend from continuous datasets
to random ones, which was almost the same as other performance values.
4.6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we analysed the spam drift problem, and through a series of empirical
studies exploited its real impact on spam classification performance. To address this
issue, we proposed a new classification method based on deep learning algorithms.
For the purpose of judging its performance evaluation, we firstly collected a part of la-
beled data (1,376,206 spam and 673,836 non-spam tweets) from a 10-day ground-truth
dataset with more than 600 million real-world tweets. Then we utilised WordVector
technique for pre-processing them and converted them into high-dimension vectors.
Furthermore, several machine leaning algorithms contributed to the classifier mod-
elling, and it produced better performances than existing techniques.
Future work may include several aspects: 1) We will carry out more theoretical
studies on the performance of our methods in order to better understand the deep-
learning based spam detection framework. This will in addition help us improve the
performance. 2) We will compare more classifiers and other methods in the future in
order to demonstrate the pros and cons of our proposed method. 3) We will also collect
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more real data from social media, particularly the datasets from other social media
such as Facebook and microblogs, and study the immigration of our spam detection
framework. 4) We will consider the computational cost and efficiency of our proposed
deep learning methods in the future. A new cloud computing environments in AWS
will be employed to run the training process, and the cost on computing resource and
electric usage will be evaluated afterwards. This part of work is very important to
both industries and academia.
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Chapter 5
Network Inferring in Online Social
Networks with User Features
In this chapter, we will propose a deep neural network based method incorporating
incomplete features of OSN users in network inference. Our method is feasible to infer
structure of OSN. Moreover, the method achieves better performance than almost all
previous method on OSN.
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Background
Networks represent a fundamental medium for spreading and diffusion of various types
of information (e.g. news, opinions and rumours) as well as epidemics (computer
virus and human being disease) [115]. For the convenience of readers, we borrow
the notations from epidemiology to describe the diffusion processes: an infection (i.e.
information or disease) appears at some node of a network and then spreads like an
epidemic from neighbouring nodes to neighbouring nodes over time via the edges of
the underlying network.
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Figure 5.1: (II) An example of online social networks and illustrations of the problems
caused by (I) alternative spreading paths and (III) users’ delivery delay. The example
was sketched from real Facebook topology [151].
In the context of network diffusion, network structures are being heavily used to
model and analyse the properties of network users (i.e. node) and their spreading
behaviours [72, 156]. However, there is a critical problem in the study of
network diffusion. In many cases, the underlying network of relations between
nodes is unknown and observation of the network is either impossible, impractical or
not cost-effective. For example, many social media users like Facebook and Twitter
would not share their own lists of online contacts to the others for privacy preserving
purpose [15]. It is also infeasible to build the full picture of node relationships in a
network when the network dynamic change and shift over time [93, 151]. In fact,
there is very limited knowledge that we can obtain from networks about
the diffusion. We often observe the temporal traces of diffusion while the pathways
over which infection spreads remains hidden. In other words. We observe the times
when each node gets ‘infected’ by the information or disease, but the edges of the
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Figure 5.2: Empirical studies of the proposed problems in previous works (real data
collected from Facebook [151] and Twitter [93]); (I) to show the number of alternative
paths for an abitrary pair of neighbouring nodes; (II) to show the time differences
caused by alternative paths; (III) to show the statistics of Twitter users’ posts that
through alternative paths
.
network that give rise to the diffusion remain unobservable. The real-world examples
include 1) online social media platforms normally show the timestamps of posts while
do not explicitely display the names of users who are in the spreading paths of these
posts; 2) doctors can obtain the patients’ infection time of disease according to their
description but may not expose the orgin from which the disease starts to spread
(e.g. SARS, 2003, China [72]). In order to better understand network diffusion, it
has become a fundamental issue in network diffusion field to use limited knowledge
like infection timestamps to infer the network structure.
Many researchers have proposed a series of methods to refer the structures of dif-
fusion networks. They can be roughly divided into two categories which are static
network inference [60, 155] and dynamic network inference [61, 143]. Both of these
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methods employed continuous time information from the diffusion to construct infor-
mation cascades. The likelihood of each edge’s existence was then estimated by time
difference between each pair of nodes. Based on estimated likelihoods, the network
inference problem became an optimisation problem, which was to search a set of edges
that maximise the likelihood against the sampled cascades. Besides, there is also a
method proposed lately adopting the changing user status to infer network [133].
5.1.2 Motivation and our work
First, according to the published papers of these methods, the accuracies of previous
methods are around 50 percent to 60 percent on inference of online media networks.
However, can they perform as good as they were in OSN inference? We have compared
the performances of diffusion cascade based methods in the experiment introduced in
Section 5.3. The performances of the methods are limited on inferring OSN with rep-
resentative structures. Second, current network data that can be obtained are diverse
in types and are tremendous in terms of volume. Hence, it is a rational consideration
to make use of complementary data in network inference aiming to enhance the per-
formance. In order to improve the inference accuracy, we first need to investigate the
reasons behind the unsatisfactory inference results. We identified two possible reasons
based on technical analysis and conducted preliminary experiments to further reveal
that the two problems are ubiquitous in online social network (introduced in problem
statement section).
We then prosed a deep neural network based method incorporating incomplete
features of OSN users in network inference. Our method is feasible to infer structure
of OSN. Moreover, the method achieves better performance than almost all previous
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method on OSN.
The sections are organised as follows: Section 5.2 discusses the critical problems in
previous network inference methods when put them into OSN inference. Section 5.3
presents our model in detail. Section 5.4 evaluate the performance of the proposed
model. Related works are introduced in Section 5.5. Finally, conclusion and discussion
are included in Section 5.6.
5.2 Problem Statement
The time stamp differences among nodes have been widely used to determine the
likelihood of edge existence. For example, in the work [60, 61, 143, 155], researchers
assume the distribution of time stamp differences complies with typical probabilistic
distributions like power-law, exponential or Rayleigh distributions. The edges among
the nodes will be recognised by a simple and ‘intuitively correct’ law: the smaller the
time difference between two nodes, the higher the likelihood of an edge between the
pair of nodes. However, are the assumption and the ‘intuitively correct’ law always
true in the real world? If not, will the errors largely affect the network inference
performance? In this section, we organised a series of empirical studies based on real
dataset in order to answer these two questions.
5.2.1 Problem from technical perspective
There are two scenarios that will lead to the problems in network inference methods
that merely use time stamps. Suppose there is a social network G for inference.
The topology of network G is shown in Figure 5.1(II). A node denotes a user and
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an edge indicates connection between users. Firstly, a message can travel through
a long path to reach the neighbouring node. For example, message posted by node
A may travel through C and D to reach B, even if B is the direct neighbour of A
(refer to Figure 5.1(I)). Hence, the time stamp recorded from C and D will be earlier
than the one from B. In return, previous methods recognise (A,C) and/or (A,D) as
two edges in the network G, which does not match the real structure of G. Second,
message may also be stored by users due to users’ behaviour and/or environment.
Therefore, the time stamp may not reflect the exact receiving and posting time of
messages (refer to Fig.5.1(III)). For example, B′ may store the message sent by A′
while D′ and E ′ instantly forward the message. Accordingly, E ′ will post the message
before B′ does. Therefore, current methods will identify edge (A′, D′) and/or (A′, E ′)
instead of the real edge (A′, B′) in network G. From technical perspective, these two
critical scenarios disable the network inference with an inaccurate likelihood caused
by misleading time stamps.
5.2.2 Problem from empirical perspective
We also carried out a series of experiments based on real datasets in order to demon-
strate the existence of the above problems. First, we investigated the number of
alternative paths between an arbitrary pair of nodes in networks (Figure 5.1 (III)).
The real datasets for this part of analysis are collected from snapshots of Facebook
( [151]) and Twitter [93] topologies. Without loss of generality, we randomly selected
100 pairs of nodes which have direct connections, and then analysed the number of
alternative paths between each pair of nodes. Assuming the transmission probability
is p (i.e. edge), probabilities of transmission through 2-hop path (p2) and 3-hop path
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(p3) are indispensable compared with p. Thus we mainly focus on the 2-hop and
3-hop alternative paths. It can be observed from Figure 5.2(I) that the number of 2-
hop and 3-hop paths takes an indispensable proportion in propagation paths between
pairs of nodes. Based on the analysis showing OSN contains large proportion of long
path between adjacent users, the potential path for spreading information could be
paths other than shortest path.
Second, we analysed the time stamp of information diffusion by using the twitter
user activity data during the discovery of Higgs boson downloaded from SNAP [93].
We uniformly sampled 500 users as retweet sources. For each source user, the time
stamps of retweeting activities of its direct neighbours (hop-1) and indirect neighbours
(hop-2) were recorded. We compared the time stamps of hop-1 time stamps and hop-2
time stamps. The comparison of an example user has been presented in Figure 5.2(II).
The closer the time stamp to the centre, the earlier the time is. It can be observed
that actually large amount of hop-2 retweet time stamps are earlier than hop-1 time
stamps. In real world, this phenomenon may be seen as some of your closest friends
may not always be the first ones to forward your posts. Furthermore, we show the
average proportion of hop-2 time stamps that are earlier than corresponding hop-1
time stamps over 500 source users in Fig.5.2(III). As the figure indicates, almost 4
out of 10 hop-2 users can retweet before hop-1 users. Thus, difference between time
stamps does not necessarily represent the likelihood of edges.
5.3 Methods
We introduce our Feature based Network Inference model (FNI) in this section. Our
objective is to infer a hidden network G based on observed sub-network of G and user
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Table 5.1: Notation definition
Symbol Definition
G The hidden network to be inferred.
G∗ The observed partial network, G∗ ∈ G.
aji Transmission rate between i and j.
X User feature vector.
E Feature vector of node pair.
Weightem Weight of the m
th feature in the node pair
feature vector.
wxu Weight of the u
th feature in the user
feature vector
wlm,n The weight from neuron m in the
(l − 1)th layer to neuron n in the lth layer.
bln the bias of neuron n in the l
th layer.
Ll−1m Output of neuron m in the l
th layer.
features. Practically, the known network G∗ used for training DNN can be obtained
by monitoring users who give consent to sharing their information or surveying user
circles on OSN. Given the node pairs in G∗ and their partial features, we are going to
infer the hidden network G. We employ multilayer perceptron deep neural network
(DNN) to infer network structure and transmission rates in the network. The pipeline
of our method contains feature construction, node pair classification and transmission
rate estimate from the DNN output. The definitions of used symbols are provided in
Table 5.1.
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5.3.1 User feature extraction
We introduced the construction of features used for edge inference in this section. We
first introduce the feature pre-processing techniques. Then the construction of node
pair features is presented.
Hierarchically embedding user feature. As the first step, we need to com-
pete the missing features for some users. In real world situation, some users may
hide their information from public for privacy, Thus the feature data collected would
be incomplete. There are several feature embedding methods to complete missing
features [46] [62] [132]. In the social network scenario, collected user features are
usually hierarchical. A user may hide private information once the information is
detailed enough for compromising the privacy of the user. Since the features in the
dataset are hierarchical, we complete the missing feature by comparing the feature
tree of the user with the complete feature tree. First, we define the tree graph by
including all features appearing at least once in collected dataset as the nodes in the
tree. We then gradually generate missing features for a user in hierarchical manner.
First, the missing features at the broken branches (i.e. the missing feature that is
the nearest to the feature tree root) are random generated. We consider the case of
binary feature, if the value at a broken branch equals to 1, the value of the descendent
feature of the broken branch will be generated randomly from {0, 1}. Otherwise, all
the descendent features under the branch will be 0 (i.e. the user does not have the
feature). Iteratively, we generate all features for users in the hidden network.
Node pair feature construction. We then construct the node pair features
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based on a mapping function ψ(Xi, Xj → Eij). Given two user feature vectors Xi
and Xj generated from previous step, if the pair of nodes i and j has the same
feature xω ∈ Xi, Xj, the feature x′ω ∈ Eij of node pair (i, j) will be assigned as 1.
Thus the user features are mapped to node pair features. Intuitively, if two user have
some same features (e.g. same education provider, home town or language etc.), it is
considered that the two users have higher likelihood to connect to each other. The
type of feature matters in determining whether there are connections between users in
OSN. To resolve the problem of weighing features, we employed deep neural network
to learn the correlation between feature and connection (i.e. edge) between people
on OSN.
5.3.2 Network inference based on DNN
In this subsection, we infer edges in the hidden network G based on multilayer per-
ceptron deep neural network (DNN). Practically, the known network G∗ and user
features of nodes in G∗ can be obtained by monitoring users who give consents to
sharing their information or surveying users in circles on OSN. Given part of the
node pairs in G and their partial features, we classify the rest node pairs in a pairwise
manner to determine possible edges of G.
Node pair classification based on DNN. We use a fully connected DNN
to infer associations between node pair features and edge existence. As the input.
Features of node pairs are put into the input layer l = 0 in which each input neuron
corresponds to a binary feature. For each perceptron in the hidden layers, the output
takes the following form:
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Lln = ΘActivation(
∑
m∈l−1
wlm,n · Ll−1m + bln)
We use Rectified linear unit (ReLU) as the activation function for each perceptron.
Given the output values from previous layer, the rectified function will generate output
as follows:
Lln = max(0, (
∑
m∈l−1
wlm,n · Ll−1m + bln))
We use cross-entropy cost to evaluation loss in DNN training. The cross-entropy
cost takes form:
C(W,B, Ss, Es) = −
∑
j
[Esj lnL
l
n + (1− Esj )ln(1− Lln)]
in which W is the weights in the DNN, B is the biases in the DNN. Initial W and
B are uniformly generated. Provided some input sample s from the training samples
S and the desired output for s, Es, we want to minimize the cost function. Stochastic
gradient-based optimisation (SGD) is used for parameter optimisation in the DNN.
Instead of traditional SGD methods, we employ Adam Optimiser [77] in our method
for the efficiency in computing. Given the gradient of previous cost function:
5LC(θ) = L
l
n − Es
Lln(1− Lln)
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where θ is the parameters, Adam optimiser iteratively updates the parameters
according to the following rules:

mt = β1 ·mt−1 + (1− β1) · 5LC(θt−1)
υt = β2 ·mt−1 + (1− β2) · 5LC2(θt−1)
mˆt =
mt
(1−βt1)
υˆt =
υt
(1−βt2)
θt = θt−1 − γ · mˆt√
υˆt + 
wherein initial step t0 = 0. m0 = 0, υ0 = 0 are two moment vectors. β1 = 0.9, β2 =
0.999 are two exponential decay rates for moment vectors. γ = 0.001 is the step size
for optimisation (i.e. learning rate).  = 10−8 adjusts the updating values of param-
eters in DNN. During the DNN training session, for each batch of input sample, the
weight and bias stop updating when they converge. Each batch includes 100 samples
in our setting. We use the trained DNN to classify node pairs. The output layer
of the DNN contains two neurons to output binary classification results of the node
pairs in G.
Inferring transmission rates in the network. In this part, we estimate the
information transmission rates between users in the OSN. The transmission rate de-
pict the speed of information spreading between user nodes. As the assumption, two
users with higher similarity in certain features (or explicitly, personality, social status
and habits) are more likely to spread information to each others. We compute the
transmission rate of edge (j, i) as follows: 1) Evaluate the weight of each feature
based on the output weights of the DNN input layer; 2) Map the node pair feature
weights back to user nodes as the weights of user features; 3) Estimate transmission
92
rates between users from feature weights. Given the weights W l0 in the input layer,
form each weight wl0m,n,m ∈ l0, n ∈ l1, we compute the node pair feature weight as
follows:
Weightem =
∑
n∈l1 w
l1
m,n∑
m∈l0
∑
n∈l1 w
l1
m,n
The node pair features weights are then convert to user feature weights Wx based
on the reverse mapping function ψ∗(Eij → Xi, Xj). It should be noticed that the
difference in features between users is as informative as the co-existence of features
between users. The weight wxu ∈ WX of a feature xu in the user feature vector X
thus becomes wxu = Weighteu . Then the transmission rate between user j and user
i will be estimated by the following formula:
aji =
∑
xu:xu∈X wxu
√
|xju|2−|xiu|2∑
xu:xu∈X wxu
in which the |∗|means getting the value of the feature ∗ of a user. The transmission
rates can be estimated by a re-training process using previously classified data.
5.4 Experiment
We evaluated FNI on both real world and synthetic datasets. We evaluated the in-
ference accuracy and precision-recall of FNI on multiple datasets. We compared the
accuracy of FNI with representative network inference methods based on diffusion
cascade. The results are presented in the following sections.
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Implementation and platform. We implemented our method using Tensorflow.
The source code written in python is provided at: URL. The platform for running
FNI is a desktop PC with Intel Core i7-3537U 2.00GHz×4, 8GB RAM and 64bit-
Ubuntu 14.04 LTS system.
5.4.1 Real world data
We downloaded Facebook ego network dataset from Stanford University SNAP database
[106]. The Facebook ego dataset was collected by a Facebook survey app which col-
lect the social circle information of participants. The collection of the dataset implies
a practical way to collect data from OSN users in the future inference tasks. The
dataset contains 88,234 friendships among 4,039 users, and the personal information
of users were also collected in the dataset. The personal information are parsed into
features by using a tree structure [94]. There are totally 1,023 features in the feature
space. The dataset has missing features which are not presented by some users. We
completed the features based on method introduced in Section 5.3.1.
Training and testing dataset. We first extracted a training dataset that ap-
proximately contains 5,000 node pairs and corresponding user features from Facebook
circle network. The proportion of positive samples (i.e. node pairs that are actually
edges in Facebook circles network) in the training dataset is 50%. We then tested the
trained classifier on 5 different sized datasets extracted from Facebook ego network.
The statistics of datasets are listed in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2: Datasets statistics
Test dataset No. Number of node pairs
1 50,000
2 30,000
3 10,000
4 5,000
5 2,500
Learning result optimisation. We iteratively optimised the DNN by recording
the latest epoch with the highest classification accuracy. During training session.
We split 10% of samples in the training dataset as test samples to calculate the
accuracy of FNI after each training epoch. If the accuracy has no improvement
after certain epoch window, the latest parameters will be kept as the parameters
for the DNN classifier. We chose the epoch window to be 20 since most training
sessions reach optimal parameter setting within 20 epochs. The correlations between
loss and epoch number is plotted in Figure 5.3. Also, we analysed the relationship
between classification accuracy and training sample number from 10 training runs.
The relationship is plotted in Figure 5.4.
It can be observed from Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 that FNI requires small amount
of samples and epochs for completing training procedure. In the actual inference
tasks, researchers can obtain small sub-network dataset and features for training and
collect partial features form the hidden network for inference tasks.
Accuracy of edge inference. We evaluated the accuracy of inference by com-
paring the inferred network against the true Facebook circle network. The accuracy
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Figure 5.3: The relationship between loss and epoch number, It can be observed that
FNI normally reaches optimal setting within 10 epochs.
definition used in this chaper is:
Accuracy =
NCorrect
N
wherein NCorrect is the number of correctly classified node pairs and N is the total
number of node pairs in test sample. The results are presented in Figure 5.5. FNI
can achieve 0.6-0.7 on accuracy.
Precision and recall. We analysed the precision and recall of FNI by tuning
the number of hidden layers and neurons. The precision-recall curves of FNI on the
5 datasets are presented in Figure 5.6. The results show that FNI achieved the best
performance with 1 hidden layers and 800 neurons in the layer.
The precisions and recalls of FNI with 1 hidden layer and 800 neurons are pre-
sented in Figure 5.7. As shown in the figure, FNI achieved similar performance in
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Figure 5.4: The relation between accuracy and number of samples used for training
from 10 independent training sessions. Each curve in the figure came from a training
session. In most cases, it can be observed that the accuracy can be optimised within
1,000∼2,000 samples, which only contribute a tiny proportion in the data volume
used in experiments. Therefore, small volume of training samples can optimise the
accuracy of the classifier.
the 5 test dataset. FNI has precisions around 0.6 and high recalls for edges inference
task. The precision and the recall are robust against changing size of test dataset.
5.4.2 Synthetic data
We construct synthetic datasets to demonstrate the problems faced by previous net-
work inference methods. We scythed a static network by using the structure of the
SNAP Facebook ego network. The structure of the network is ubiquitous in OSNs.
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Figure 5.5: The accuracy of network inference on 5 datasets with different sizes. FNI
achieves accuracy of inference around 0.6 ∼ 0.7 based on small set of training samples.
Furthermore, it can be observed that FNI is robust against varying testing dataset
size.
We then simulated 100 cascades on the network following the method introduced
in [128]. The purposes of using this network structure are: 1) This structure differs
from media site network structure which has been extensively researched in related
works [60], [61], [128], [135]; 2) This structure is a typical OSN topology that ubiq-
uitously exists on OSN. The structure of the network is shown in Figure 5.8. We
compared the performance of FNI with NetInf and NetRate, which are two state-of-
art network inference methods. The following sections will first introduce the syn-
thesis process and comparison rules. Second, the comparison on accuracy is presented.
Synthetic data generation and rules for comparison. We generated 2 sets
of cascades by simulating the spreading of information in OSN. There are 100 cascades
in each sets. Most information on OSNs dies out very soon. Only few information
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Figure 5.6: The P-R curves of FNI on the 5 datasets. We swept layer number from
1 to 3, and neuron number from 100 to 1,000 with 100 increase in each interval.
about phenomenal topics can spread virally in OSNs. To simulate this phenomenon,
we assigned each cascade a popularity value p to mimic real information. Cascade
with lower p will be forwarded to/by less neighbours. Being different to the indepen-
dent cascade model (ICM) used in generating synthetic data for NeInf and NetRate,
our generative model does not generate diffusions in a broadcasting manner. Through
parameter p, the neighbours who will receive the diffusing information are sampled
from total neighbours, and the alternative diffusion paths between users (as indi-
cated in the first problem) can be reflected in the synthetic data. Nodes in cascades
record the earliest time stamp when they receive the same information for several
times. We set p = 0.02 in the generative model. This setting also avoids generating
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Figure 5.7: The precision and recall values of FNI when there is 1 hidden layer and
800 neurons in the hidden layer.
complex cascades that affect the computational cost of NetInf and NetRate. Once
the neighbours whom the information will be forward to/by are determined by the
p. The probability for forwarding will be measured by transmission likelihood. We
generated the transmission likelihood between each pair of neighbours by sampling
from uniform distribution U ∼ (0.01, 0.5). The transmission rates between nodes are
drawn from U ∼ (0.01, 1).
We then generated the receiving time stamp once the information is forwarded out
to a neighbour. For the first cascade set, the transmission model used for generating
timestamps is exponential model. We expected this cascade set to reflect the effect of
OSN topology structure on performance of previous methods. In the second cascade
set, we added random noise time tδ ∼ (0.1t∆, 0.9t∆) on each forwarding action to sim-
ulate the delay mentioned in Section 5.2, wherein t∆ is the time difference calculated
based on exponential model. We set the cascade observation time window T = 10.
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Figure 5.8: The network structure used to build synthetic data. The structure reflects
typical OSN community topology.
We used the exact node pairs presented in the generated cascades as the test sam-
ples for the FNI. Features of these users are imported from the Facebook ego network
dataset as the input for the FNI. We compared the inference accuracy of FNI against
NetInf and NetRate on these same users. There are totally 240 users in Cascade set
1, 274 users in Cascade set 2.
Accuracy of edge inference. We compared the accuracy of our method with
the accuracies of NetInf and NetRate on generated synthetic data as introduced. The
accuracy comparison is presented in Figure 5.9. As shown in Figure 5.9, NetInf and
NetRate had very limited accuracies. The cascades with time delay further reduced
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Figure 5.9: The accuracy comparison of NetInf, NetRate and FNI. Both of NetInf
and NetRate give very low accuracy.
the performance of the two methods. The results support our problem statements in
Section 5.2.
5.5 Related work
The network Inference is closely related to many areas. First, NI has connections to
the studies in influence maximising problem. The aim of influence maximisation is to
find the diffusion pathways, and the initial node set starts from which the information
can diffuses to the maximum number of nodes in the network. Second, NI is similar to
the link prediction research. Link prediction methods mainly focus on the inference
tasks based on the observed node profiles, meta data of nodes and edges, and the
partial topology of the network.
Network inference emerged as a research topic lately. The aim of network inference
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is to disclose the structure of hidden networks. The applications of inference are
mainly epidemic control [115] and analysis of information difussion in online media.
[155].
Existing methods can be broadly categorised into 3 classes based on observed/input
data for inference.
Firstly, there are methods based on diffusion cascade [60], [61], [128], [112], [143],
[155]. Diffusion cascade contains time information of the diffusion. Based on the
observed time difference between node pairs, the transmission likelihoods between
nodes are estimated. From then, the inference task is transformed to finding a network
structure that maximises the likelihood of generating cascades as the observed data.
The network to be inferred can be static [112], [60] or dynamic. This category of
methods can be applied to the scenario in which timestamps can be obtained. For
instance, in online social network platforms, the timing of a post/message being
forwarded/received can be observed. The timestamps can then be used as input to
infer the underlying network structure.
Secondly, method using diffusion trace emerges [133]. Diffusion trace differs from
cascade on that exact timestamps are unnecessary. However, the sequence of nodes
on the diffusion path is required. Similarly, diffusion trace based method infer hidden
network by estimating a network that maximise the likelihood of generating observed
traces. The typical scenario is about the disease spreading. During the study of the
spreading of diseases, a survey about the population infected by the disease will be
provided from time to time for the analysis of the diffusion pathway. In this case,
neither the orders of infection nor the accurate infection timestamps are known. We
can observe the infected individuals at each time to analyse the sequence of nodes on
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the diffusion path.
Additionally, a method relying on text reuse was proposed [135]. The causality of
text reuse is used to infer latent network structure.Text information can be obtained
easily from online media sites, or from online social networks. For instance, when we
want to infer the underlying news network, we can directly collect articles/posts from
the media sites. In this case, the text from the post/article along with the publish
timing of the post/article can be used to estimate the likelihood of a connection
between two media sites.
5.6 Conclusion
We propose a method which uses limited knowledge of sub-network topology and
small amount of user features to infer the large hidden OSN network. The proposed
method can achieve viable accuracy, precision and recall on real and synthetic social
network dataset. The method outperforms diffusion cascade based methods on OSN
network with typical topology. Furthermore, since our method only requires small
amount of training samples, it is feasible to collect data by surveying small group of
OSN users to acquired data. Incomplete user features can also be used in our model.
Moreover, The method exhibits robustness, satisfactory complexity and scalability
against varying size of hidden network.
As our future work, firstly, a better strategy for completing feature is going to
be proposed. A main concern for user feature based network inference is that user
features might be difficult to obtain. As a matter of fact, some OSN users (active users
or celebrities) prefer to display more information about themselves to public while
others are more willing to preserve their information as privacy. Based on observing
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the dissemination of posts or other content sourced from active users/celebrities in
OSN, the hidden features of other users can be inferred. In return, the inferred
features can strengthen the evidences for network inference using classifiers. Next,
other data source may be applied on the proposed model in order to make it more
suitable for real world tasks. Information within text, image and sound can both be
valuable for inferring topology of latent network.
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Chapter 6
A Case Study of the
Cyber-Physical Symbiotic Social
Networks
The recent popular game, Poke´mon GO, created two symbiotic social networks by
location-based mobile augmented reality (LMAR) technique. One is in the physical
world among players, and another one is in the cyber world among players’ avatars.
To date, there is no study that has explored the formation of each social network
and their symbiosis.In this chapter, we carried out a data-driven research on the
Poke´mon GO game to solve this problem. We accordingly organised the collection of
two real datasets. For the first dataset, we designed a questionnaire to collect players’
individual behaviours in Poke´mon GO, and used maps of Melbourne (Australia) to
track and record their usual playing areas. Based on the data that we collected, we
modelled the formation of the symbiotic social networks in both physical world (i.e.
for players) and cyber world (i.e. for avatars) as well as interactions between players
and Poke´mon GO elements (i.e. ‘bridges’ of the two worlds). By investigating the
mechanism of network formation, we revealed the relatively weak correlation between
the formation processes of the two networks. We further incorporated the real-world
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pedestrian dataset collected by sensors across Melbourne CBD into the study of their
symbiosis. Based on the second dataset, we examined the changes of people’s social
behaviours in terms of most visited places.
6.1 Introduction
The movie ‘The Matrix’ showed us a scene with two connected worlds: physical world
and cyber virtual world. Characters can shuttle back and forth between the two
worlds and interact with others. Nowadays, this fancy movie scene comes into being
due to the emerging Location-based Mobile Augmented Reality (LMAR) techniques
[55]. LMAR is changing the form of social networking from multiple aspects. Unlike
traditional online social media and oﬄine community, LMAR based social media
requires users to physically attend to certain locations for interacting with others.
People who interact online using avatars can also derive interactions in the real world
when they are physically brought together by LMAR application. Therefore, LMAR
has complicated the boundary of social networks, and it also cultivates brand-new
forms of social networks. Accordingly, the cyber (virtual) world relationships and the
real world connections of people evolve into two symbiotic social networks.
As one part of the symbiotic networks, the cyber social network states the relation-
ships among the online avatars. At the same moment, an oﬄine, location-sensitive
physical social network rises among the corresponding users through face-to-face com-
munication, greeting, or more generally, staying in a same area. The emerging mobile
game Poke´mon GO released by Niantic is a catalyst for symbiotic network formation.
The game requires a player to arrive at certain places in order to interact with vir-
tual game content. Players can also battle each other at the in-game facilities called
107
gyms, which are usually pinned on landmark buildings of the real world. The battles
between players in the cyber space form a cyber social network. On the other hand,
since players need to stay in certain areas for playing, their interactions with other
players in the real world form an oﬄine physical social network. Hence, the cyber
social network and the physical social network symbiotically affect each other.
Previous works about social network mainly focus on studying homogeneous social
networks, including the structures, robustness, and user behaviours. The formation
and effect of symbiotic social networks has not been deeply examined. Meanwhile,
the study of symbiotic network formation can be of great importance to government
decision making and society safety. Moreover, the formation of symbiotic social net-
work can be used as a reference and tool in psychological research which studies the
formation of social connection and the cognition of human relationship. Potentially,
since Poke´mon GO and alike applications have great capability to increase physical
activity of individuals, this research may assist the analysis of the impact of LMAR
on user health.
We carried out a data-driven research to study the symbiotic networks formed
by the oﬄine interactions of users and the online connections of the avatars. We
studied the properties, user behaviour, and formation of such novel social networks.
Accordingly, we used two real datasets in our research. First, we designed a question-
naire to collect Poke´mon GO players’ individual behaviours in Poke´mon GO. Maps
of Melbourne were then introduced to track and record players’ usual playing areas.
Second, we employed pedestrian count data imported from sensors distributed across
Melbourne CBD to reflect social behaviours that differ from that of players. Based
on the Poke´mon dataset, we first built a symbiotic social network of Poke´mon GO
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players. The building process models and simulates the formation of social interaction
among the players. Second, we analysed the relationship between the formation of
the virtual network and the physical network. Next, we investigated how the social
behaviours changed after the symbiotic network emerged. According to our experi-
ment, the popular socialising locations of people have drastically changed after the
interference of Poke´mon GO. Our work is essential for modelling the information
diffusion, the user behaviours, or the impact of AR/VR on human interaction in
symbiosis social networks.
In the following sections, we will present the details as follows: methods for col-
lecting and analysing data are presented in Section 6.2 and 6.3. Outcomes of data
analysis are exhibited in Section 6.4. Related works are introduced in Section 6.5.
Finally, the whole chapter is concluded in Section 6.6.
6.2 Dataset 1: Poke´mon GO Data
To investigate the formation of the symbiotic social networks of Poke´mon GO player
and the symbiosis of the networks, we designed a survey including the related ques-
tions. 1
1We submitted and received Deakin’s approval for our survey. To protect the privacy of respon-
dents, we avoided asking the personal sensitive details such as name and contact information. In
addition, we claimed that all confidential information in the questionnaires would be strictly pro-
tected and would not be released. Throughout the survey, we introduced our research team and
provided contact information of ours in Deakin University. We also explained our research purpose
to participants, some of whom showed interest in our work and expressed strong encouragement.
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6.2.1 Questionnaire
We distributed questionnaires to players to collect their playing information (see the
details of our questionnaire in Section 6.6.1). According to the content, the questions
can be broadly classified as follows:
Demographics: We asked respondents for their age, title, poke´mon master level,
poke´mon team and interaction preference with other players as the demographics of
players. This information was mainly developed to justify the consistency of our
survey with existing statistics.
Temporal Information: These kinds of questions are related to time arrange-
ment of players. We recorded the approximate frequency and time that players spent
on the game. In addition, we also asked them about their working or studying time.
By these questions, we can conclude the approximate physical social network con-
struction of players. According to the survey results and location data (see details in
Subsection 6.2.2), we can infer the construction of physical and cyber social network
for players.
Travelling Distance and Means: To catch more poke´mons and challenge gyms,
players usually need to travel afar. Therefore, travelling distance and means were
investigated as well. This kind of data is expected to extract some preliminary infor-
mation such as the behaviour comparison among respondents in terms of travelling
style.
6.2.2 Location Data
We used printed maps containing annotations of street name, poke´stop and gym to
collect areas of playing from participants. The playing location is the key point for
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Figure 6.1: The Melbourne CBD map with poke´mon annotated on. Poke´mon is an
important virtual element in the game. The link between virtual world and physical
world is reflected by poke´mon-master association.
deriving the symbiosis of cyber/physical social networks. Considering the fact that
asking players to recall the places they travelled to could be difficult to implement
online, we decided to use printed map to collect data on street.
We attached two maps with the questionnaire to collect the location information
from the Poke´mon GO players. The first map is of Melbourne CBD (i.e. small map),
and the second map is the zoomed out great Melbourne area (i.e. big map). The
big map is 10× larger than the small map in size. We annotated part of the gyms,
poke´stops and poke´mons according to the Poke´mon GO map application from Google
map.
Annotations of virtual content are transposed to the two maps. The distribution
of poke´stops on the big map is over-dense, so we excluded poke´stops from the big
map. As another fact, gyms are distributed more sparsely and have more significant
inner differences than poke´stops. For this reason, compared to the small map, we
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Table 6.1: Travelling Distance Statistics: Part II of Questionnaires
Distance Respondents
Catching poke´mon Challenging gym
< 1 km 17 16.35% 44 42.31%
1 km ∼ 5 km 36 34.62% 36 34.62%
5 km ∼ 10 km 24 23.08% 14 13.46%
10 km ∼ 20 km 13 12.50% 2 1.92%
> 20 km 14 13.46% 5 4.81%
No record 0 0.00% 3 2.88%
mainly consider the impact of gyms on the big map. Consequently, the positions of
gyms and poke´stops are annotated on the small map, while poke´stops are excluded
from the big map 6.1.
6.2.3 Questionnaire Justification
In this section, we analyse the information extracted from the questionnaire outcome
and compare the result to two Poke´mon GO reports.
Preliminarily, we make a statistical study on the responses of the questions. Sta-
tistically, the travelling distance for catching poke´mon is less than the travelling
distance for challenging gym(6.1). Compared to catching poke´mon, players are more
likely to challenge gym nearby. From Table 6.2, we can see that only 37.26% players
had no interaction experience with others while playing games. This presents great
opportunities to construct physical social networks among players.
The frequency distribution histograms for players in terms of four aspects are
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shown in Fig. 6.4. Since there exists null values in the results, we applied the
ratio representation instead of the sum in the frequency distribution histogram. If a
player had more than one option such as on travelling means, we assumed that the
probability of each option obeys uniform distribution. Fig. 6.4 (A) shows the result
of how possible a player would challenge gyms in different time periods. We can see
that most players prefer to challenge gyms in the evening, which is out of business
time. The occupation is just under 40% among five breaks. It can be found that less
gym challengers are active in the afternoon and night, the percentages of them are
no more than half of the ratio towards evening. However, there are just over 10%
players playing in the morning or noon.
We then compared the frequency of travels means selection by players between
catching poke´mon and challenging gym in Fig. 6.4 (B). It can be concluded that
compared to catching pok’emons, players were more likely to use transport vehicles
(i.e. car, train, tram and bus) in challenging gyms. In addition, most people preferred
to drive their own vehicles to challenge gyms, while they chose not to travel faraway
places to catch poke´mons.
We also analysed the demographics of Poke´mon GO players in Fig. 6.4 (C) and
(D) in terms of age and master level, separately. We can see that the players were
mainly from 20 to 30 years old, which accounted for around 80% of all ages. As for
master levels, they were randomly distributed from 5 to 35. Significantly, the number
of players at level 22 took a dominant place, the percentage of which were at least
twice as any other level. There are rare players whose levels reached to more than
29, with only a few at 35.
We further compared our survey result with two existing Poke´mon GO statistic
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analysis reports [1, 2] to justify the rationality of our questionnaire design. It was
found that the distribution of our data was corresponding to current statistics in
terms of age, team and gender as shown in Table 6.3. In the table, we removed the
null values when each proportion was calculated, so the sum of ratios in each category
(e.g. Gender) was 100%. Except age, the value difference was not higher than one
tenth of the values for comparison. The ratios of players aged from 18 to 34 differed
with less than one fifth difference. In general, our questionnaire was proved to be
reasonable since it followed historic distribution rules.
6.2.4 Implementation of the Survey
In this subsection, we describe how our experiment was carried out.
Geographic Location We conducted the survey in the Melbourne CBD. We
walked there and randomly surveyed the players who were playing Poke´mon GO at
that time. In total, we have collected questionnaires of 104 players.
Time The investigation lasted for four days, from 18th to 21st August, 2016. We
distributed questionnaires mainly during evening and night (around 6-10 pm), which
was considered as spare time. And also, we observed that the number of players
during that period was higher than other time of a day.
6.2.5 Data Storage and Preprocessing
We preprocessed the collected data for storage and analysis.
Questionnaire preprocessing The answers of collected questionnaires were
translated into one-hot encoded answer vectors for computer processing. The vec-
tors and the unchanged demographic information were entered into a database.
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Areas of Action 
Players Marked
(A) Big map (Metropolitan Melbourne) (B) Small map ( Melbourne CBD)
Figure 6.2: The example of the gridded big map and small map. Within the black
circle is the playing area marked by the participant. Blue round dots are poke´stops
and the red-white triangles are the gyms.
Location Data Preprocessing We preprocessed the collected location data.
First, we gridded the small map by a 33×21 mesh grid, each grid equals a 160m×160m
area. Similarly, the big map is gridded by a 30×20 mesh grid in which each grid covers
a 1, 600m×1, 600m area. Second, we translated the locations marked by participants
into coordinates of the grids which touch the marked location areas. The example
of the big map and small map with grid are presented in Fig. 6.2. The coordinates
of players were stored in the database. On the other hand, we recorded the density
of poke´mon, poke´stop and gyms in each grid. The density data were also stored in
database.
6.3 Dataset 2: Pedestrian Data
We used the pedestrian dataset to study the impact of the cyber social network to
the structure of the physical world in terms of population distribution in the city
area. The data is collected by 43 sensors distributed across Melbourne city. These
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sensors return pedestrian counts of the previous hour monthly. The data has been
collected from year 2009 to date. The dataset includes 1,000 sensor records totally,
each of which contains the latitude and longitude of the sensor, collecting date/time,
the name of the street, and the counted hourly pedestrian number. 2
6.3.1 Computing Pedestrian Density in Grid
We adopted the pedestrian count value as the hourly density of pedestrian according
to the nature of the data. We then computed the pedestrian density in each grid. We
transformed the latitude and longitude of each sensor to the position in the mesh grid
on the small map. We used Google map API (https://developers.google.com/maps/web-
services) to find the latitudes and the longitudes of the mesh grid boundaries. The
range of latitude and longitude of the mesh grid are [−37.829725,−37.797483] and
[144.937239, 145.001183], respectively. The size of the used mesh grid on the small
map is 33× 21. Therefore, we computed the ranges of latitude and longitude of each
grid. Given a sensor’s location, the sensor will be assigned in the grid whose latitude
and longitude range covers the sensor’s location. We could therefore get the positions
of the sensors in the mesh grid. The pedestrian density in a grid thus equals the
pedestrian count in the grid. For a grid containing multiple sensors, the density is
set as the average pedestrian number from all sensors in the grid.
2The pedestrian count data was imported by APIs from Melbourne City Government database
(https://data.melbourne.vic.gov.au). The sensors used to collect pedestrian count data were de-
ployed in most popular roads and streets over Melbourne CBD, by government approved agencies.
The data was retrieved by sensor logs periodically.
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6.3.2 Completing Pedestrian Density
Since the pedestrian density of the grid in which there is no sensor was unknown,
we first completed the pedestrian density in this section. We inferred the density of
pedestrian in each grid based on a regression model. We compared three regression
models, namely radial basis kernel support vector regression (SVR) [134], kernel ridge
regression (KR) [13], and linear regression (LR) [113].
Initially, we extracted features for the regression models. Suppose we have a set of
grids Gall. GS ⊆ Gall are the set of grids in which there are sensors. The set of grids
in which the pedestrian density will be estimated therefore is GE = Gall − GS. We
compared three different metrics and adopted one as the feature for regression. Since
the distribution of people highly related to spatial information, the three evaluated
metrics utilise spatial distance and pedestrian count value.
As the first metric, for each grid gk ∈ Gall, we computed the average distance-
weighted density coefficient C:
C(gk) =
∑
gj∈GS
ngj
Dist(gk,gj)
2
N
wherein ngj is the pedestrian count in grid gj. N is the number of grids in GS.
Dist(gk, gj) is the Euclidean distance between grid gk and gj. Second, for each
gk ∈ Gall, we recorded the pedestrian count NC(gk) in the nearest grid of gk in GS:
To achieve better performance, we employed cross validation to evaluate regression
performance and chose the best model. We split 30% of the total training samples
as testing samples in cross validation. Then, we evaluated regression performance
in terms of mean average error (MAE), mean average percentage error (MAPE),
explained variance score (EVS), and R2 score. We also tuned the features used in
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Figure 6.3: The performance comparison of SVR, Kernel Ridge, and Linear Regres-
sion. SVR achieves best performance in terms of MAE, MAPE, EVS and R2 score.
regression to improve the regression performance. By solely using C(gk), the regres-
sion models gained the best performance. Among the regression models, SVR using
radial basis kernel performed as the best regression model on all metrics (Fig.6.3).
Thus we adopted SVR using radial basis kernel to infer pedestrian density for each
ge ∈ GE. The inferred pedestrian density is utilised in Section 6.4.
6.4 Results
6.4.1 Preliminary Analysis on Questionnaire and Location
In this section, we present the statistics of the survey participants and their playing
behaviours according to the questionnaires. Participants are anonymised for privacy
considerations. As shown in Table 6.4, 75% of the 104 respondents played Poke´mon
GO every hour or every day, while there were only around 15.38% of the players
challenged gym at the same frequency. It is deduced that players were much less
frequent in challenging gym than catching poke´mon.
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Figure 6.4: Our preliminary statistical analysis of the questionnaires are based on
the followed frequency distributions: (A) Time of players challenging gyms (note:
’1‘: Morning, ’2‘:Noon, ’3‘: Afternoon, ’4‘: Evening, and ’5‘: Night.), (B) Travel
means selected in catching poke´mon and challenging gyms (note: ‘Other’ represents
the players who never travelled far away.), (C) Ages of players, and (D) Master levels
of players.
Next, we analysed the characteristics of the obtained data in terms of player
location distribution, gym distribution, poke´stop distribution, poke´mon distribution
on the big and small map. Based on the collected location data with the mesh grid,
we plotted the heat map of distributions in Fig. 6.5. For each grid, we accumulated
the number of player whose playing area includes the grid. The accumulated value
is the number of player in this grid. In this manner, we got the relative density
distribution of players on the whole mesh grid. The relative density of virtual content
on the mesh grid is counted in the same way. It can be observed from Fig. 6.5 that
players are mainly distributed in the CBD area on the map of greater Melbourne. As
for the locations on the zoomed in small map, players are gathered in the city central
and south bank areas. We then analysed the correlations of the distributions.
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Figure 6.5: The distribution heat maps of player, gym, poke´stop, and poke´mon in
Melbourne.
6.4.2 Formation and Symbiosis of Symbiotic Social Networks
Physical Social Network: Human Interaction in Real World
The interactions among players are analysed in this section. We assume that two
players staying in the same grid at the same time of a day have the potential to
physically meet and interact with each other in the real world. We then estimate
the probability of meeting, which indicates the likelihood that social activity occurs
between the two players.
We first defined Pu,v as the probability that two players u and v come across each
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Figure 6.6: (A) The intervals between different time of a day. The interval between
night and morning is 8 hours, and others are 4 hours. (B) The locations of user u
and v in the mesh grid.
other in the physical world. In other words, P stands for the formation likelihood
of the interaction between a new player and other existing players. As an intuitive
assumption, we assume that: 1) P (u, v) decreases with increasing distance between u
and v; 2) P (u, v) decreases with increasing time interval between the timing when u or
v plays the game. Second, we define Pu,v as 1 when u and v stay in the same grid in the
same hour of a day. According to the previous research, the timing of many human
activities follows Poisson distribution [16]. Furthermore, as a statistical property of
Poisson processes, the time intervals between consecutive events follow an exponential
distribution, while distributions obeying power-law are also observed [105]. According
to the property held by the time interval, in this research, we estimate the probability
P (u, v) using the following model. The model serves as a prompt for the utilisation
of this dataset. Extension and better model can be proposed in the future.
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Figure 6.7: The interactions between the avatars of the 104 players and the gyms
on the maps. (A) The virtual network of avatars, including gyms, on big map. (B)
The virtual network of avatars, including gyms, on small map. Red nodes are gyms
and blue nodes are avatars. The edge standing for the existence of interaction links
the character and the gym if the gym is in the location of the player to whom the
character belongs. (C) The joint network of avatars and players on big map. (D) The
joint network of avatars and players on small map. There is an edge connecting two
avatars if their players share the same gyms in their playing areas to form the virtual
interaction. Isolated nodes are also plotted to show the avatars without interaction
with others.

P (u, v) = α · e−α·∆tu,v or P (u, v) = α ·∆t−1−αu,v
α = 1
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wherein α is the penalty on the probability based on the distance between the
locations of the players (Fig. 6.6(B)). ∆Su,v denotes the average Euclidean distance
between u and v. ∆Su,v is computed as:
∆Su,v =
∑
i∈A(u),j∈A(v)
dist(i, j)
herein i, j are the coordinates of the grids that are from the active areas of player
u and v, respectively. dist(i, j) is the Euclidean distance between i and j. ∆tu,v is
the time interval (Fig. 6.6(A)). Specifically:
∆tu,v =

8 between night and morning
4 Otherwise
We calculated the defined P of all the surveyed players. By setting a cutoff of
P , the network in which P between any player pair exceeds the cutoff is selected.
A physical social network conditioned by the cutoff selection is therefore built. We
swept the cutoff from 0.1 to 0.9 in steps of 0.1. We considered the generated net-
work as non-trivial for studying if the network has average node degree larger than 1.
Therefore, we set the cutoff as 0.2 in this chapter to obtain the non-trivial network.
The value can be tuned to acquire network of different scales.
Virtual Social Network: Avatars in Virtual World
In this section, the analysis about the interactions among avatars (e.g. poke´mon
masters) is presented. The gym is the sole venue in the game for the avatars to
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interact. Once players win the gym battles, they become leaders of the gyms and
their poke´mons will be selected as gym guardians. Then other players’ poke´mons
can interact with the defenders even when the gym leaders are not geographically
close to the gym. From another perspective, avatars in the game derive interaction
at the gyms. Therefore, the interaction activity through challenging gym constructs
a virtual social network among poke´mons.
Firstly, we obtain the virtual interaction network of gyms and avatars based on
the assumption that once the playing area of a player has a gym in it, the interaction
between the avatar of the player and the gym is existing. The virtual network is
plotted in Fig.6.7 (A) and (B). In fact, the edge and gym nodes in the network are
dynamic.
Then, we calculated the interaction probability of two arbitrary avatars in the
poke´mon world. In the world, each avatar was mapped as the poke´mon belonging to
each player. We assumed that a players challenges each gym in their area at the same
probability. Given two avatars uv and vv which are corresponding to two players,
their meeting probability in virtual world can be expressed as below:
P ′(uv, vv) = n(uv, vv)/(n(uv) ∗ n(vv))
wherein n(uv) and n(vv) represent the number of gyms in the area of u and v re-
spectively, and n(uv, vv) means the number of gyms in the common area of u and v.
In the cyber social network, there is an edge connecting two avatars if their players
share the same gyms in their playing areas to form the virtual interaction. Differing
from the P of physical interaction probability, we used P ′ as the weights of edges in
the network.
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Symbiosis: Player and Virtual Content
The interaction between player and virtual content (e.g. poke´mon ,poke´stop, and
gym) is established when the player is hunting poke´mons, visiting gym, or connected
to poke´stop. In this section, we intended to shine a light on how the virtual content
from the mobile AR application can affect players in the real world. First, we inves-
tigated which virtual content has the most significant impact on player distribution.
Second, we presented the analysis on the gradients of distribution density of play-
ers and virtual content. And then we studied the relationship between the gradient
directions of players and virtual content.
We adopted the Pearson correlation coefficient (PCC) to analyse the covariance
of the density of players and the density of virtual content based on the data in
distribution matrices from Section B. We compared the PCC between players and
three types of virtual contents (i.e. gym, poke´mon ,and poke´stop) on the small map.
The result is presented in Table 6.5. Gym density has very limited correlation with
player while the distributions of poke´mon and poke´stop have much higher correlation
with players. Interestingly, players are mostly driven by poke´mon or poke´stops rather
than gyms.
We then analysed the relations between gradients of densities on maps. For
grid (i, j) in a matrix M of the mentioned distributions (i.e. distributions of play-
ers, poke´mon, poke´stop and gym), we computed the gradient of the density d(i, j)
along four directions. Specifically, we compute ∆dN = d(i, j) − d(i − 1, j), ∆dS =
d(i, j) − d(i + 1, j), ∆dW = d(i, j) − d(i, j − 1), and ∆dE = d(i, j) − d(i, j + 1). A
gradient vector V Mi,j consisting of the four variation values can be constructed. Next,
for (i, j) in distribution matrix M ′, we can have another vector V M
′
i,j . The Euclidean
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Figure 6.8: The height represents the the difference in the gradient of player distri-
bution and the gradient of virtual world distributions of poke´mons, poke´stops and
gyms. Fig. A, B and C are based on distributions on small map, and Fig. D is based
on distributions on big map.
distance between V Mi,j and V
M ′
i,j is calculated. The distance reflects the difference of
density variation in the vicinity of grid (i, j) (see details in Fig. 6.8). Comparing
Fig. 6.5 and Fig. 6.8, it can be observed that the density variations are significant
within the areas in which more players gather. According to Fig. 6.8 and Fig. 6.5,
we can observe that the density of players and the density of virtual content show
positive correlations. However, the gradients of the densities are highly distinguishing.
6.4.3 Impact of Symbiotic Networks
We investigated the impact of the symbiosis on cyber social network and the physical
activity network in this section.
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Figure 6.9: (A) The distribution of node degree in the cyber social network. The
degrees demonstrate a power-law alike distribution. (B) The joint network of two
symbiotic networks of avatars and players. The degree distribution differs from the
power-law distribution.
Relationship between Formation Process
We investigated the correlation between the formation processes of two symbiotic
networks, based on the condition that the formation processes of the networks are
determined by probability. We adopted the Pearson correlation coefficient (PCC)
to analyse the covariance of the interaction probability among physical players and
avatars in terms of the big map and the small map. The result is presented in Table
6.6. It is indicated that while the interaction probability shows positive correlation,
the correlation in the big map is significantly higher than it in the small map. As
explained in Subsection 6.4.2 and 6.4.2, time was considered as an impact factor of the
meeting probability of players, while in the virtual world, characters interact without
the restriction about time. Therefore, we then investigated the time effect on the
meeting probability correlation between physical and virtual world. We removed ∆t
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(as mentioned in Subsection 6.4.2) to produce the results of the physical world without
the time impact, and its correlation with virtual social networking is shown in the
right column of Table 6.6. As both PCC values in big map and small map decreased
with time, time was proved to be a reduction factor of interaction consistency of
players between the two worlds. However, Table 6.6 reveals that the virtual activity
of players could not sufficiently reflect the physical behaviours conversely due to the
low PCC value in both scenarios.
Change on Social Network and Social Behaviour
In this section, we first analysed the change on degree distribution of nodes in the
social network. We then investigated how the location based mobile AR app can
affect people’s physical social behaviour. We compared the socialising hot-spot of
Poke´mon GO players and normal pedestrians in Melbourne CBD area.
We first analysed the topological characteristics of the cyber social network formed
by the interactions among avatars. The degree distribution of the networks are il-
lustrated in Fig. 6.9. It can be observed that the degrees of the network formed by
gyms and avatars roughly obeys the power-law distribution, which is typical for online
social networks. Secondly, we joined the cyber social network formed by avatars and
the physical social network formed by people on associated players and their avatars.
The joint networks are plotted in Fig. 6.7 (C) and (D). The degree distribution of the
joint network demonstrates a non-power-law distribution. The degree changes more
rapidly than the power-law curve.
Second, we looked into the change on the physical social behaviour of people,
in particular, the popular socialising venue of people. We compared the pedestrian
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density inferred in Section 6.2 in Fig. 6.10. We considered the following 5 groups of
sensor data: 1) The average count value of all time; 2) The average count between
00:00 to 12:00 of all time; 3) The average count between 12:00 to 24:00 of all time;
4) The average count between Thursday to Sunday of all time; 5) The average count
within every August since 2009. Since we collected player location data in August,
from Thursday to Sunday in the evening/night, the setting of these rules helps us
to unify the conditions for comparison.For each group of data, we correspondingly
trained SVR and inferred the density of all grids without sensors.
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Figure 6.10: Comparison of the relative densities of Poke´mon GO players and pedes-
trians on the small map. The colour bar at the right side of each plot indicates the
density of people. The distributions show differences in the locations of player and
non-player.
We compared the social hot-spots of the non-player pedestrians and the players.
The highly populated areas usually suggest the existence of more social activities.
Therefore, by comparing the density of people, we intend to reflect the area with
more social activities. According to Fig. 6.10, the social hot-spot of pedestrians
is around (15, 13) while the hot-spots of Poke´mon GO players are located in grid
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(13, 15) and (15, 8), where have most of poke´mons gathered. Players shift to the
popular locations under the effect of the AR based app according to the aggregation
of virtual content.
6.5 Related Work
The characteristics and interactions of traditional online/oﬄine social networks have
been exclusively analysed. On the other hand, the perception regarding location
based mobile AR applications is evolving. It is of interest to understand how AR can
affect social behaviour of users, and what the characteristics of the social network
would then have. We provide a brief review of the research about social network
characteristics and location based AR. As the latest phenomenal LMAR application,
Poke´mon GO has also been introduced in terms of the impact it brings and the
perception it receives.
Analysis on Single Social Networks The topological structures of social net-
works and the user behaviours in the networks have been extensively studied. Social
network could be broadly categorised into two kinds, namely static social network
and dynamic social network. Currently, the social networks are mainly dynamic.
For example, the online social network (OSN) is one representative type of social
networks. The studies around OSNs (e.g. Twitter, Facebook, Flickr, and Yahoo!
360 etc.) have revealed the features of impacting events diffusing in the network,
and clues behind OSN user behaviours [82, 148]. A study conducted by Kumar et
al. analysed the evolution and dynamics of the social network. Most of the studies
address the topological feature (e.g. degree distribution, density, cluster coefficient,
connectivity etc.) of the networks [80]. Second, studies on social networks from the
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socio-technical and user behavioural perspectives were conducted [38–40]. Also, the
attributes of social network were also studied. For example, Heravi et al. studied the
privacy calculus decision making processes in OSN [67], and David et al. found that
a static network is more helpful in constructing stronger cooperation than traditional
population distribution [125]. Apart from the single social network, there are also few
studies about the symbiotic social network. Yagan et al. studied the information dif-
fusion in conjoining social networks and revealed that information transmission speed
and scale were remarkably larger in the conjoining online and physical social network
than in the single social network [161]. However, though a few of the current works
catch a glimpse of the symbiotic social network, the analysis on formation, feature,
and user behaviour of LMAR based symbiotic social network was not provided.
Interconnected Networks To better understand the physical interactions for
individuals, complex networking models are generally employed. In fact, there are
many sub interconnected networks in the real-world scenarios. For instance, Dickison
et al. and Wang et al. developed the epidemics effect through interconnected net-
works [47, 172]. In their studies, the impact on epidemic broadcasting was analysed
according to different connection strength of two mutually interdependent networks.
Likewise, Radicchi experimentally explored the spectral features in the networks with
different dynamic and topological properties such as degree distributions and connec-
tion distinction between intra-connected networks and interconnected networks [123].
In addition, the attribute robustness was also studied by researchers. For example,
Parhami proved that swapped networks were significantly robust and they have rela-
tively small degrees of nodes [119]. Radicchi and Arenas also proposed that although
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there were sufficient distinct attributes such as robustness for the interconnected net-
works, abrupt transition would also occur inwards [124]. By contrast, our study about
Poke´mon GO mainly focuses on the formation of the symbiotic networks, where each
connection is weighted numerically.
Location based Augmented Reality Differing from previous studies that fo-
cused on the technical details of AR components [175], research on mobile AR usage
concentrates on the acceptance, user experience, and perceptions of mobile AR func-
tionality [117]. Alternatively, researchers conducted experiments to test how mobile
AR applications can be useful for certain applications such as navigation [126]. In-
vestigation on the usage of Layar, which is a widely installed mobile AR application,
exhibits the formation of social practises around mobile AR, and how emerging me-
dia may complicate the practices, experiences, and relationships in the spatial land-
scape [96]. Similar to Poke´mon GO, Layar can overlay points of interest, annotations,
or pictures on camera input of the real-world scene based on global positioning sys-
tem. The development of an LMAR application named CityViewAR was presented as
well [22,87]. The study mainly focused on the design and the implementation of the
application. Though studies about mobile AR related applications are continuously
presented, there is no research modelling the social behaviours of users under LMAR
technology. There is also an absence of study that analyses the relations between
physical social networks and virtual contents from the LMAR application.
Impact of Poke´mon GO The impact of Poke´mon GO on player’s physical ac-
tivity has recently been studied [11]. The results of the study suggest that Poke´mon
GO can significantly increase the daily physical activity of players. Likewise, it was
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found that social comparison in online social networks could effectively activate in-
dividuals to do physical activity [171, 172]. The impact brought by Poke´mon GO
on traffic, personal security and privacy has attracted attention from government in
some countries [107,167,170]. Current studies or perceptions about Poke´mon GO are
mainly focusing on the pros and the cons of Poke´mon GO on health and psychology.
There is neither comprehensive analysis about how the AR application associates
with or changes the real world social behaviours, nor study from the social network
perspective.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analysed the symbiosis and characteristics of symbiotic social
networks among users of a location based augmented reality application. For study-
ing symbiotic social network formation, we collected a Poke´mon GO player dataset
which contains the player demographics, playing behaviours, and playing locations.
By incorporating real world pedestrian count data, we studied the change on social
behaviour brought by symbiotic social network in terms of spatial hot-spot deriving
social activity. For the first time, this paper offers a clue for the study of symbiotic
social networks. This study provides a series of results from real-world data, which
will contribute to the future research on large-scale symbiotic social networks. The
research has its limit. Through survey, the accuracy of the collected player location
data is varying. Even though we required the respondents to mark their location as
accurate as possible, human caused error still exists. Second, the collected data con-
tains no social connection information due to the privacy preservation consideration.
Therefore the performance of the proposed model is unable to be validated. We will
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develop better mechanism for collecting dataset that records social graphs of partici-
pants in our future work to tackle these issues. Based on this paper, the dynamics of
the symbiotic social networks and the information diffusion in the networks will also
be modelled in our future work.
From an economic perspective, the study of cyber-physical symbiotic social net-
work formation could provide insight into mechanisms of social capital creation and
social influence generation compared with purely physical or virtual/cyber social net-
works - potentially allowing companies to more effectively leverage LMAR technology
to concurrently build both physical and virtual social capital and influence across tra-
ditional commerce, e-commerce, and social commerce platforms. Social support and
companionship deriving from social networks have also been shown to impact pro-
foundly on mental health [29]; however, studies have predominately focused on the
effects of either physical social networks (e.g. family, romantic relationships, friends)
or virtual social networks (e.g. social media). A greater understanding of the forma-
tion and operation of cyber-physical symbiotic social networks could provide insight
into the specific effects, whether positive or otherwise, of LMAR technology on men-
tal health. Further, cyber-physical symbiotic social networks may provide different
levels or types of social support compared with purely physical or virtual/cyber social
networks.
In next chapter, we will conclude this thesis and highlight several directions for
future research.
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6.6.1 Appendix: Questionnaire
This is the questionnaire that was handed to Poke´mon GO players in the Melbourne
city.
Demographics
1. What is your title? [Mr, Mrs, Miss, Dr, Other]
2. What is your age?
3. What is your Poke´mon master level?
4. Which Team did you select? [Blue, Red, Yellow, No team]
5. Do you interact with other players in the real world? [Greet them, Group with
them, Friend them, No interaction]
Temporal
1. Approximately, how much time do you spend on playing Poke´mon GO per
week? [Less than half an hour, Half an hour ∼ 1 hour, 1 hour ∼ 2 hours, More
than 2 hours]
2. How frequent do you play Poke´mon GO? [Check it every hour, Play it casually
every day, Play it a day or two in a week, Almost forgot it]
3. How much time do you spend on working or studying per week? [Less than 5
hours, 5 hours ∼ 15 hours, 15 hours ∼ 30 hours, 30 hours ∼ 50 hours, More
than 50 hours]
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4. How frequent do you go to challenge gym? [Every day, Few times per week,
Few times per month, Never]
5. What time in a day are you likely going to challenge gym? [Morning, Noon,
Afternoon, Evening, Night]
Travel Distance and Means
1. What transport do you take when you travel to faraway places for catching rare
poke´mon? (You may choose multiple answers) [Private vehicle, Train, Tram,
Bus, On foot, I don’t travel to faraway places]
2. Within how long of travelling distance do you think is acceptable for catching
rare pok’emon? [Less than 1 km, 1 km ∼ 5 km, 5 km ∼ 10 km, 10 km ∼ 20
km, More than 20 km]
3. What transport do you take when you travel to faraway places for challenging
gyms? (You may choose multiple answers) [Private vehicle (driving or passen-
ging), Train, Tram, Bus, On foot, I don’t travel to faraway places]
4. Within how long of travelling distance do you think is acceptable for catching
rare challenging gyms? [Less than 1 km, 1 km ∼ 5 km, 5 km ∼ 10 km, 10 km
∼ 20 km, More than 20 km]
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Table 6.2: Demographics Statistics: Part III of Questionnaires
Demographics Respondents
Title
Mr 63 60.58%
Mrs 6 5.77%
Miss 33 31.73%
Dr 0 0.00%
Other 0 0.00%
No record 2 1.92%
Team
Blue 40 38.46%
Red 35 33.65%
Yellow 25 24.04%
No team 3 2.88%
No record 1 0.96%
Interaction preference
Greeting 37.75 36.30%
Grouping 6.25 6.01%
Friending 19.25 18.51%
No interaction 38.75 37.26%
No record 2 1.92%
Note: No record: the player failed to answer the question. When asked about
interaction preference, some players had more than one choices. Therefore, for
those players, we divided 1 by the number of choices, and added each division to the
cumulative value of respondents.
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Table 6.3: Comparison between Existing Statistics and Our Survey Result
Age Team Gender
18∼34 Yellow Blue Red Male Female
Existing 78% 25% 43% 32% 60% 40%
Ours 93% 25% 40% 35% 62% 38%
Difference 15% 0% 3% 3% 2% 2%
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Table 6.4: Temporal Statistics: Part I of Questionnaires
Time or Frequency Respondents
Time spent on playing Poke´mon GO per week
< 0.5 hour 10 9.62%
0.5 hour ∼ 1 hour 14 13.46%
1 hour ∼ 2 hours 12 11.54%
> 2 hours 68 65.38%
Frequency of playing Poke´mon GO
Every hour 23 22.12%
Every day 55 52.88%
One or two days in a week 17 16.35%
Almost forgot it 9 8.65%
Time spent on working or studying per week
< 5 hours 16 15.38%
5 hours ∼ 15 hours 22 21.15%
15 hours ∼ 30 hours 20 19.23%
30 hours ∼ 50 hours 40 38.46%
> 50 hours 4 3.85%
No record 2 1.92%
Frequency of challenging gym
Every day 16 15.38%
Few times per week 45 43.27%
Few times per month 17 16.35%
Never 25 24.04%
No record 1 0.96%
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Table 6.5: PCC between player and virtual content
Player/Gym 0.069
Player/Poke´mon 0.385
Player/Poke´stop 0.480
Table 6.6: PCC between interaction probability among physical players and avatars
Time considered Time eliminated
Big map 0.3046 0.3220
Small map 0.0784 0.0848
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Works
We summarize the research of this thesis in Section 7.1. Section 7.2 highlights several
directions for future research.
7.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we have addressed some research challenges on twitter spam detection
methods. We also proposed a solutions about the network inference in online social
networks. Meanwhile, we carried out a case study on the symbiotic social networks.
Firstly, we have discussed a series of Twitter spam detection methods, particularly
the most recent ones which were published in the past three years. Our literature
review was organised by the categories that were divided according to different feature
selection methods. They are the detection methods based on syntax analysis, feature
statistics and blacklists.
In addition, we also provided comparative studies on various Twitter spam detec-
tion methods, especially on the performance of different classifiers. Our comparison
concluded that most classifiers have no significant differences in detection performance
except some specific scenarios (e.g. refers to the Precision plot in Fig. 3.4). We also
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analysed and compared the impact of various features to the detection performance.
We adopted PCA and a set of distance metrics to measure the impact.The results
suggested different features might lead to dramatic difference in performance (e.g.
refers to Fig. 3.1 and 3.7).
Secondly, we analysed the spam drift problem through a series of empirical stud-
ies, explored its real impacts on spam classification performance. To address this
issue, a new classification method based on deep learning algorithms was proposed.
For judging its performance evaluation, a part of labeled data (1,376,206 spam and
673,836 non-spam tweets) from a 10-day ground-truth dataset with more than 600
million real-world tweets was collected. Then the WordVector technique was applied
for pre-processing them and converting them into high-dimension vectors. Further-
more, several machine leaning algorithms contributed to the classifier modelling, and
the experiments result show our proposed detection method produced better perfor-
mances than existing techniques.
Thirdly, We proposed a method which used limited knowledge of sub-network
topology and a small amount of user features to infer the large hidden OSN network.
The proposed method can achieve viable accuracy, precision and recall on real and
synthetic social network dataset. The method outperforms diffusion cascade based
methods on OSN network with typical topology. Furthermore, since our method only
requires a small amount of training samples, it is feasible to collect data by surveying
a small group of OSN users to acquire data. Incomplete user features can also be used
in our model. Moreover, The method exhibited robustness, satisfactory complexity
and scalability against varying size of hidden networks.
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Finally, by conducting a case study on Poke´mon GO in Melbourne CBD, we anal-
ysed the symbiosis and characteristics of symbiotic social networks among users of a
location based augmented reality application. By incorporating real world pedestrian
count data, we studied the changes of social behaviours brought by symbiotic social
network in terms of spatial hot-spot related social activities. For the first time, it
offers a clue for the study of symbiotic social networks.
The research work in this thesis is significant for academic and industrial per-
spective. In particular, the proposed schemes and studies have the potential to be
of benefits in OSNs, cyber-physical system, social network applications, and future
researchers, etc.
7.2 Future Works
Our work can be extended in the following directions in the future.
Firstly, we will try to design a new types of method to explore spam feature based
on the structure of social graph with limited time and resource consumption. Now
we have 600 million tweets. It is possible to construct a small social graph to conduct
spam drift.
Secondly, we will continuously optimise our neutral network based network infer-
ence method. A better strategy to collect more valuable features is to be developed.
A main concern for user feature based network inference is that user features might
be difficult to obtain. As a matter of fact, some OSN users (active users or celebri-
ties) prefer to display more information about themselves to public while others are
more willing to preserve their information due to privacy issues. By observing the
dissemination of posts or other content collected from active users/celebrities in OSN,
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the hidden features of other users can be inferred. In return, the inferred features
can be strengthen by the evidences from classifiers. Next, other data sources may be
applied to the proposed model in order to make it more suitable for real world tasks.
Information such as text, image and sound can be valuable for inferring topology of
latent network.
Thirdly, we will contribute to the future research on large-scale symbiotic social
networks. We will develop better mechanism for collecting accurate dataset that
records social graphs of participants , and also extend our research to mental healthy,
social behaviors safety, privacy protection issues of symbiotic networks users in our
future work. Based on this case study, the dynamics of the symbiotic social networks
and the information diffusion in the networks will also be modelled in our future work.
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